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INTRODUCTION
In the second half of the twentieth century, Europe formed
the European Economic Community ("EEC") and began a
process of economic integration to bring about a common
market among its members.' Over the years, as the EEC
developed, one of its members, Germany, grew concerned over
the conflict between its own domestic laws and those regulating
the European Community ("EC"). Specifically, Germany
expressed concern with the possibility that EEC regulations
disregard the fundamental rights guaranteed by Germany's
constitution, known as the German Basic Law or Grundgesetz
("GG").2 EC law, which is the body of treaties and legislation
that have a direct or indirect effect on Member States, has
become progressively more pervasive and influential over the
years. 3 As EC law became more all-encompassing due to the
further integration
of Member
States,
the German
Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht ("BVerfG"),
issued rulings regarding the protection of rights set forth in the
GG from encroachment and possible infringement by European
1. The Treaty of Rome, signed on March 25, 1957, established the European
Economic Community ("EEC") as a way to integrate Member States via trade and
became effective on January 1, 1958. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. The EEC was later renamed the European
Community ("EC") to reflect the determination to expand the EEC's powers beyond
economic issues. See Summaries of EU legislation, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/
legislation-summaries/institutional affairs/treaties/treaties eec en.htm (last visited
May 25, 2012) (explaining the history of the EEC).
2. See E R. Lanier, Solange, Farewell: The Federal German Constitutional Court and the
Recognition of the Court ofJustice of the European Communities as LawfulJudge, 11 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 1, 2 (1988) (noting a widespread debate in Germany during the 1960s
over the democracy deficit in the EC); see also KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 122 (2010) (indicating that Germany initially refused to accept
the primacy of EU law regarding the guaranteed protection of fundamental rights).
The Grundgesetz ("GG") is the Basic Law of the Republic of Germany and has been
adopted as its constitution. GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGB1. I (Ger.).

3. See generally Piet Eeckhout, The Growing Influence of European Union Law, 33
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1490 (2011) (explaining how EU law has gained more influence
through its scope and autonomy); "GrowingInfluence Brings Growing Responsibilities".-A
Europe Day Message From EU Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, EUR. UNION @ UNITED
NATIONS (May 9, 2008), http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article-7862en.htm (noting that the European Union has gained greater influence in the world as
Europe has unified and pooled its resources).

2012] GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA WIN THE EURO-CRSIS1545
law. 4 The BVerfG has traditionally been the forum to resolve
domestic disputes concerning the direction of the European
Union because political parties have generally agreed on the
necessity of an integrated Europe and Germans opposed to
further integration found little support in those political
5
parties.
This tension between German Basic Law and the EC has
again resurfaced as the current European debt crisis threatens
the Eurozone and the European Union. 6 Throughout 2011, the
Eurozone worked to prevent the extreme sovereign debt of
Greece from spreading to other fiscally weak Eurozone
members exposed to Greek debt in order to avoid a systemic
default throughout the Eurozone, which could potentially lead
to a new global recession. 7 At the center of this dilemma is
4. See infra Part I (discussing several Bundesverfassungsgericht ("BVerfG") rulings
on European integration's effect on rights protected by the GG).
5. See Thomas Giegerich, The FederalConstitutional Court'sJudgment on the Treaty of
Lisbon-The Last Word (German) Wisdom Ever Has to Say on a United Europe?, in 52
GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 10 (Thomas Giegerich & Alexander Proelss eds., 2009) (noting
that for decades German political parties agreed on promoting integration in Europe);
see also Kurt Kiesinger, Hello to Berlin: The German ChancellorDiscusses the Euro Crisis and
Domestic Politics,ECONOMIST, July 9, 2011, at 50-51 (noting Chancellor Angela Merkel
discussing the need to push out euro-skeptics and to forestall the emergence of a euroskeptic political party).
6. See infra Part II (discussing the latest BVerfG ruling addressing the conflict
between the GG and the interests of the EC). The European Union currently consists
of twenty-seven nations that form an economic and political partnership. See Basic
Information on the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basicinformation/indexen.htm
(last visited May 25, 2012) (explaining the basic
configuration of the European Union). The Eurozone is defined as seventeen nations
within the European Union who have adopted the euro as their currency, and have
thus entered into an economic monetary union with fellow members. See The
Euro/Monetary Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/money/
euro/index en.htm (last visited May 25, 2012) (explaining the basic configuration of
the Eurozone).
7. SeeJason B. Gott, Addressing the Debt Crisis in the European Union: The Validity of
Mandatory Collective Action Clauses and Extended Maturities, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 201, 20304 (2011) (recognizing that observers understood the danger of sovereign default in
the European Union and its potential to derail the world's economic recovery); see also
Jim Jubak, If Greece Defaults... Then What?, MSN MONEY (Sept. 22, 2011, 7:30 PM),
http://money.msn.com/investing/if-greece-defaults-then-what-jubak.aspx
(describing
how a default by Greece would lead investors to flee from other economically weak
nations within the Eurozone causing European banks and insurance companies to
suffer loses that in turn could spread to US banks, which have US$670 billion exposed
to the debt of weaker Eurozone nations); IMF Predicts Global Recession When Greece
Defaults, ARABIAN MONEY (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.arabianmoney.net/bankingfinance/2011/09/21/imf-predicts-global-recession-when-greece-defaults/
(noting that
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Germany, the Eurozone's strongest economy, upon which
faltering members depend for bailouts, and upon which the
European Union as a whole relies as a solid foundation during
this crisis.8 As the debt crisis in the Eurozone worsens, once
again the BVerfG must address constitutional limitations, and its
decision could become a serious burden to the government's
future action in the European Union. 9 The BVerfG has long
been concerned with the possibility of Germany losing its
fundamental democratic and sovereign rights to the supremacy
of the EC. 10 Despite these deliberations, Germany has been
progressing towards a stronger union with other members of the
European Union through the treaties it has signed, most
recently the Treaty of Lisbon.11 This amalgamation has forced
a default could shock banks, lead to a global economic slowdown, and cause another
recession).
8. See Bill Witherell, Germany & the Eurozone, FIN. SENSE, Aug. 29, 2011,
http://www.financialsense.com/node/6237 (stating that Germany is the strongest
economy and the "stability anchor" in the Eurozone); see also Eurozone Depends on
Germany-Italy's Tremonti, REUTERS, Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/09/23/italy-germany-treonti-idUSR1E7KF03L20110923 (recognizing the
Italian finance minister's statement about Europe depending on Germany); Liam
Halligan, Germany Must Decide if It Wants the Eurozone to Survive or Perish,TELEGRAPH
(U.K.), Nov. 12, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/liamhalligan/
8886350/Germany-must-decide-if-it-wants-the-eurozone-to-survive-or-perish.html
(noting that EU members view Germany as the nation with the most influence in
directing the future of the Eurozone).
9. See Wolfgang Mfinchau, Stop Rejoicing. This Was No Victory for the Eurozone, FIN.
TIMES (London), Sept. 11, 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/e39dcac6-dae9-11eOa58b-00144feabdcO.html (noting that the September 7, 2011 decision of the BVerfG
("Sept. 7 Ruling") dismisses policy options beyond was has already been agreed on); see
also German Court Warns Ruling No Blank Cheque for Bailouts, TELEGRAPH (U.IK), Sept. 7,
2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8746664/German-courtwarns-ruling-no-blank-cheque-for-bailouts.html (noting that the BVerfG's Sept. 7
Ruling potentially hampered the German government's ability to act decisively in the
crisis).
10. See discussion infra Part I (noting prior rulings where the BVerfG addressed
German sovereign rights and the EC's expanding power).
11. The Treaty of Lisbon, which is the latest amendment to the Treaty of
European Union ("TEU"), increases the effectiveness of the European Union and
grants more powers to the European Parliament. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
2007 O.J. C 306/01. The Treaty of Lisbon has given the European Parliament more
powers in lawmaking, budgeting, and international agreements. See, e.g., Treaty of
Lisbon-A Democratic and More Transparent Europe, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/
lisbon treaty/glance/democracy/index-en.htm
(last
visited
May
25,
2012)
(summarizing die Treaty of Lisbon); see also Giegerich, supra note 5, at 10 (indicating
that for decades, German political parties agreed on the necessity of promoting
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those opposed to integration to bring suit in the BVerfG as a
substitute to debate in the political forum. 12 The result is an
inconsistency in which the GG asserts Germany's sovereign
identity, while Germany's politicians and citizens push it closer
to uniting with the rest of Europe, inevitably leading to the loss
of some sovereign power. 13 Germany now exists in a state of
uncertainty in which it has agreed to membership in a monetary
union within the Eurozone that permits each country to
independently decide its own budget and therefore precludes
14
any true fiscal union.
Today, this lack of a fiscal union threatens to cause the
common currency, the euro, to collapse. 15 One proposed
integration); Quentin Peel, Germany Plans Closer EU Integration, FIN. TIMES (London),
Oct. 26, 2011, at 6 (noting that German politics continue to push the nation into closer
integration with the European Union).
12. See Giegerich, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that the BVerfG is the only practical
forum where laws on further European integration can be challenged); see also Helen
Pidd, Greek Bailout Challenged in Germany's ConstitutionalCourt, GUARDIAN (U.K), July 6,
2011, at 25 (commenting that politician and euro-skeptic Peter Gauweiler has often
brought constitutional complaints against German integration).
13. See Wolfgang Mtinchau, Berlin Has Dealt a Blow to European Unity, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.) (July 12, 2009, 7:55 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/48bbec78-6f10-11de9109-00144feabdc.html#axzzlh6bjQPsl (commenting that the BVerfG ruled that the
ultimate authority rests in the Member State, not in the European Union, and that
power may be shared but sovereignty may not); see also Sovereignty and the EU,
EUROMOVE, http://www.euromove.org.uk/index.php?id=6505 (last visited May 25,
2012) (noting that Member States give up some of their power when making a treaty
that removes a right to a decision, which they otherwise would have). Compare
GRUNDGESETZ art. 20(1) (Ger.) (indicating Germany as a democratic and social federal
state), with Giegerich, supra note 5, at 10 (indicating the political push for a more
integrated Europe).
14. See How Economic and Monetary Union Works, EUROPEAN COMMISSION-ECON. &
FIN. AFF., http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/euro/emu/how/index-en.htm (last
visited May 25, 2012) (noting that although there is an integrated monetary policy,
each member nation sets its own fiscal policy); see also Willem F. Duisenberg, President,
Ph.D., European Central Bank, Introduction at the International Monetary Conference
(June 3, 2003),
available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2003/html/
sp030603.en.html) (asserting that "in the euro area, fiscal policies remain under the
exclusive responsibility of national governments"); Luke Baker & Julien Toyer,
Germany, France Examine Radical Pushfor Eurozone Integration,REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/27/us-eurozone-crisis-idUSTRE7AQOCF20
111127 (noting that France and Germany are looking for ways to establish a fiscal
union within the Eurozone).
15. See Matthew C. Turk, Implications of European Disintegrationfor International
Law, 17 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 395, 415 (2011) (recognizing that many commentators argue
that only a fiscal union can save the Eurozone from its "disintegrative path"); see also
Baker & Toyer, supra note 14 (commenting on the attempts of France and Germany to
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solution to this problem is the further unification of the
Eurozone under a common fiscal policy, possibly including a
16
mingling of Eurozone debt under a single common bond.
Such a solution would not be compatible with the GG,
according to the core constitutional rights to democracy and
sovereignty articulated in the September 7, 2011 decision of the
BVerfG ("Sept. 7 Ruling").17 In the near future, Germany will
either have to make some difficult decisions and compromises
in order to resolve this predicament or will be forced to accept
the consequences of inaction.18
This Comment argues that a fiscal union will be necessary
in the long-term for the Eurozone to survive and that the way in
which the BVerfG interprets the GG will have drastic
implications on Germany's ability to further integrate with the
Eurozone. Part I explores previous rulings by the BVerfG that
addressed the tension between German constitutional law and
secure a fiscal union in the Eurozone in order to avoid a collapse of the currency);
Walter Brandimarte et al., Nobel Economists Say Euro Zone Needs Fiscal Union, REUTERS,
Oct. 10, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/10/nobel-economics-idU
SL5E7LA1W20111010 (noting economist Christopher Sims stating that the Eurozone
needed to create a fiscal union in order to avoid a collapse of the euro).
16. See Wolfgang Munchau, The Only Way to Save the Eurozone from Collapse, FIN.
TIMES (London) (Nov. 13, 2011, 7:57 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/
64eeb9c8-0c5e-11 e 1-8ac6-00l44feabdc0.html#axzzl ddX81LfP
(indicating
that
Eurobonds are needed to save the Eurozone from collapse); see also Baker & Toyer,
supra note 14 (noting that Eurobonds could pave the way for the European Central
Bank ("ECB") to act more forcefully).
17. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 7,
2011, Europaische Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht [EuZW] 920, 2011 (Ger.), availableat
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs20110907-2bvr098710.html
[hereinafter Sept. 7 Ruling]. For a press release summarizing the decision in English,
see Press Release, Federal Constitutional Court, No. 55/2011, Constitutional
Complaints Lodged Against Aid Measures for Greece Against the Euro Package
Unsuccessful-No Violation of the Bundestag's Budget Autonomy (Sept. 7, 2011),
available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvgl1-055en.html; see
also infra Part II (discussing the details of the ruling made by the BVerfG on September
7,2011).
18. See Oliver Drews, Germany Faces Tough Choices in Euro-Zone Crisis, Bus. DAY
(Nigeria) (Dec. 15, 2011, 12:18 PM), http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.
aspx?id=161331 (noting that Germans face a difficult decision between saving the
"European project" or maintaining separate liability from other Eurozone members);
see also Fiona Ehlers & Hans Hoyng, Deutschland ist das Neue China, 48 DER SPIEGEL 108,
Nov. 28, 2011 (indicating that Germany faces the collapse of the euro or risks
damaging its creditworthiness and facing large-scale inflation if it agrees to measures to
save the euro). A translation in English is available at http://www.spiegel.de/
international/europe/0,1518,800351,00.html.
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EC law and then turns to the history of the Eurozone economic
crisis leading up to September 2011. Part II discusses the ruling
of the BverfG on the legality of bailouts to faltering Eurozone
members, and the implications of these rulings upon future
actions of Germany. Part III explains why it is unlikely that the
Eurozone will be dismantled and what future actions Germany
may be able to take to strengthen the Eurozone while abiding by
the constitutional limitations established by the BVerfG.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TENSION BETWEEN GERMAN
AND EUROPEAN LA WAND THE EUROPEANECONOMIC
CRISIS
In the last several decades, the BVerfG has issued important
rulings regarding the sovereign powers that Germany is allowed
to surrender to the EC. 19 The Sept. 7 Ruling is the latest decision
that denotes important implications regarding the further
transfer of German powers. 20 To appreciate the Sept. 7 Ruling, it
is necessary to understand the context in which it was decided.
Part L.A describes the German Solange cases, which hold German
law superior to EC law in order to protect fundamental rights.
Part I.B analyzes the complaints regarding loss of sovereign
powers and democratic legitimacy brought to challenge the
German ratification of the EU treaties. Finally, Part I.C discusses
the onset of the Eurozone economic crisis, and the measures
taken to alleviate financial tensions leading up to the Sept. 7
Ruling.

19. This Comment will not describe all the constitutional cases that have been
brought to the BVerfG regarding this issue, but will only highlight the most relevant
ones. Some of the cases addressing integration that are not mentioned further are
European Arrest Warrant, BVerfG, July 18, 2005, 113 BVERFGE 273 (Ger.); Banana
Market Organization, BVerfG, June 7, 2000, 102 BVERFGE 147 (Ger.); Euro, BVerfG,
Mar. 31, 1998, 97 BVERFGE 350 (Ger.); Television Directive, BVerfG, Mar. 22, 1995, 92
BVERFGE 203 (Ger.); and Kloppenburg, BVerfG, Apr. 8, 1987, 75 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS

[BVERFGE] 223 (Ger.).

See generally Giegerich, supra

note 5, at 10 n.5 (noting prominent BVerfG cases regarding the conflict between the
German Constitution and European law).
20. See infra Part II (discussing the Sept. 7 Ruling in more detail).
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A. The Solange Cases
1. Solange I
Prior to the establishment of the European Union, and
even before the reunification of Germany, the BverfG addressed
the concern of the inadequacy of European law to protect the
fundamental rights of the German people. In 1974, a German
export firm, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, asked the
Administrative Court of Frankfurt am Main ("FAC") to rule on
the applicability of a European regulation regarding the
payment of a bond in conjunction with an application for an
export license ("Solange f').21 The FAC at first requested a
preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"),
but later referred the case to the BVerfG after the ECJ ruled that
EC law could not be held to be in violation of national
constitutional principles. 22 The BverfG did not find the
regulation in violation of the GG, but used the opportunity to
make a controversial ruling on the relationship between
European law and German constitutional law.23 The BVerfG
ruled that the EC lacked a democratically legitimized parliament
and codified fundamental right and "so long as" ("solange" in
German) it lacked a provision to protect human rights
comparable to those granted by the GG, the BVerfG would be

21. BVerfG, May 29, 1974, 37 BVERFGE 271 (Ger.), [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540
[hereinafter Solange 1]; see Bill Davies, Dealing with the Fallout: West Germany's
Response to the Solange Decision (1974), at 3 (unpublished manuscript, EUSA
Conference 2011), available at http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/5d davies.pdf
(noting the export firm asked the Administrative Court of Frankfurt am Main to rule
on the European regulation). The Administrative Court is the court of original
jurisdiction in the federal German judicial system, having general competence over
administrative matters with some exceptions. See Lanier, supra note 2, at 4 n.13
(commenting on the jurisdiction of the German administrative courts).
22. See Solange I, supra note 21, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 546-48 (noting the
procedural history of the case); see also Lanier, supra note 2, at 5-7 (noting the
procedural history of the case); Davies, supra note 21, at 3 (asserting that the
administrative courts asked for a preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") before referring it to the BVerfG).
23. See Solange I, supra note 21, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 542-43 (holding that Article
12 of the GG does not pose an obstacle to the application of the challenged rules); see
also Lanier, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that the Solange Idecision "provoked a storm of
criticism" over the unity of the EC system); Davies, supra note 21, at 3 (stating the
BVerfG did not find a problem with the technical details of the case but used the
opportunity to issue a highly controversial judgment).
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able to rule on the applicability of EC law to Germany. 24 While
the German government is allowed to transfer some of its
sovereign powers to intergovernmental organizations like the
EEC pursuant to Article 24 of the GG, the BVerfG clarified that
Article 24 does not allow the Constitution to be amended or the
25
constitutional order to be infringed on via simple regulation.
Out of concern for the protection of the democratic process and
the explicit rights set forth in the GG, the court denied the
26
absolute supremacy of EC law.
2. Solange Il
Twelve years after Solange I, in 1986, the BVerfG ruled on a
case regarding an EEC agricultural regulation on the
importation of processed foods. 27 The petitioner, Wiinsche
Handelsgesellschaft, a German processed-foods importer,
argued that certain temporary protective measures blocking
imports had become obsolete and should be removed. 28 When
the ECJ ruled against the petitioner, the petitioner alleged a
denial of constitutional rights, including the right to have
adjudication on factual determinations made by a lawful judge

24. See Solange I, supra note 21, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 551 (noting the BVerfG's
ruling that the EC could not adequately protect fundamental rights and the BVerfG
had the power to review rulings by the ECJ in order to protect those rights); see also
Lanier, supranote 2, at 7-8 (summarizing the decision by the BVerfG).
25. See Solange I, supra note 21, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 550 (noting the BVerfG's
ruling regarding Article 24 of the GG); see also Lanier, supra note 2, at 8 (recognizing
the ability to transfer powers under Article 24 and the BVerfG's decision that this ability
does not allow for infringing on the constitutional order).
26. See Solange I, supra note 21, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 564 (noting the dissent's
concerns that the ruling could lead to a fragmentation in the law and negate the idea
of unification); see also FRANz C. MAYER, THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION AND THE
COURTS: ADJUDICATING EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A MULTIEVEL SYSTEM 11

(2003) (noting that the BVerfG put constitutional limits of the supremacy of European
law and reserved the right to judicial review to safeguard fundamental rights); Lanier,
supra note 2, at 8 (stating that the BVerfG exercised the power to protect fundamental
rights even against the ECJ's interpretation of EC law).
27. BVerfG, Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVERFGE 339 (Ger.), [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225
[hereinafter Solange I1]; see Lanier, supra note 2, at 11-15 (noting the initial complaint
brought before the BVerfG in Solange I1).
28. See Solange II, supra note 27, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at 234 (noting the petitioner's
complaint that the protective measures should be removed); see also Lanier, supra note
2, at 15-16 (stating that the petitioner argued that the regulations had lost their basis
in fact and therefore in law).
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of the national court, the right to freely practice its trade, and
29
the right to a hearing.
Upon hearing this case, the BVerfG ruled that the
circumstances in the EC had changed enough to render earlier
reservations from Solange I obsolete. 30 The EC had developed
enough in its ability to protect rule of law, democratic
principles, and human rights so that earlier reservations
regarding the EC could be abandoned.31 The ECJ was now to be
regarded as the lawful adjudicator in cases where EC regulations
and directives conflicted with rights under the GG, so long as
the German Court believed that the ECJ ensured effective
32
protection of fundamental rights.
B. The EU Treaty Cases
When Germany first acceded to the European Union, and
subsequently ratified amendments to the Treaty of European
Union ("TEU"), parties who opposed these actions brought
constitutional challenges against integration. This Section

29. See Solange II, supra note 27, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at 238-39 (indicating the
petitioner's complaint before the BVerfG); see also Lanier, supra note 2, at 18-19
(noting the petitioner's constitutional complaint before the BVerfG).
30. See Solange I, supra note 27, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at 259 (noting that the BVerfG
found the ECJ to be the lawful adjudicator under Article 101 of the GG and that it has
the authority to make final decisions within its assigned competence); see also MAYER,
supra note 26, at 12 (stating that the BVerfG recognized that an effective protection of
fundamental rights existed at the European level after an extensive assessment); Lanier
supra note 2, at 21 (indicating that the BVerfG found that the EC had become more
sophisticated and the reservation from the prior Solange ruling could be abandoned).
31. See Solange II, supra note 27, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at 258-59 (noting that the
BVerfG found the EC developed enough to protect basic rights); see also Lanier, supra
note 2, at 22 (asserting that the BVerfG found the EC developed enough to
satisfactorily protect human rights); Miriam Aziz, Sovereignty Lost, Sovereignty Regained?
The European IntegrationProject and the Bundesverfassungsgericht6 (European Union Inst.,
Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, Working Paper No. 31, 2001) (noting that
the BVerfG recognized that the EC now had a level of protection for basic rights that
was comparable to the protection offered by the GG).
32. See Solange II, supra note 27, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at 259, 265 (noting the
BVerfG's decision that the European Court could rule on such cases as long as it
continued to protect fundamental rights); see also Lanier, supra note 2, at 21 (indicating
that in the second Solange decision, the BVerfG determined that the ECJ could be the
lawful adjudicator "so long as" the BVerfG determined it was adequately protecting
human rights); Aziz, supra note 31, at 6 (noting that as long as the general level of
protection was secured by the ECJ, the BVerfG would not review the level of protection
in specific cases).
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discusses the cases brought to the BVerfG by those opposed to
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon,
and the rulings handed down regarding Germany's loss of
sovereign power to the European Union.
1. The Signing of the Maastricht Treaty
As Germany was preparing to ratify the Maastricht Treaty to
become a member of the newly formed European Union, the
BVerfG ruled on a case brought before it that challenged the
constitutionality of the treaty ("MaastrichtRuling").3 Prior to the
ratification process, the German Parliament-the Bundestag
and Bundesrat-amended the GG to allow Germany to
participate in a united Europe by allowing some of its sovereign
powers to be transferred to European institutions.34 The
complainants in the Maastricht Ruling brought suits regarding
the constitutionality of the treaty under numerous potential
violations. 35 The complainants' primary argument hinged on
their interpretation of Article 79(3) of the GG, which does not
33. BVerfG, Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVERFGE 155 (Ger.), [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57
[hereinafter MaastrichtRuling]; see Rudolf Geiger, EU Constitutionalism and the German
Basic Law 4 (Univ. of Miami Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 5. No.
1A, 2005), available at http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/geigerfinal.pdf (noting that
Manfred Brunner, a former chief of cabinet member of the EC, who lodged a
constitutional complaint against the German statute ratifying the Maastricht Treaty).
34. GRUNDGESETZ art. 23(1) (Ger.); see Manfred H. Wiegandt, Germany's
International Integration: The Rulings of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the
Maastricht Treaty and the Out-ofArea Deployment of German Troops, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 889, 891 (1995) (noting that the newly amended Article 23 allows for the transfer
of some sovereign rights); see alsoJoachim Wieland, Germany in the European Union-The
Maastricht Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 259, 260 (1994)
(indicating that the German Parliament amended the GG to legalize Germany's
membership in the European Union); Kevin D. Makowski, Comment, Solange III: The
German Federal Constitutional Court's Decision on Accession to the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 155, 160 (1995) (noting that the GG was
amended to allow some Parliamentary powers to be transferred to the European
Union). The Bundestag is the national parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany.
See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocse/index.html
(last
visited May 25, 2012). The Bundestag is distinct from the Bundesrat, which is another
parliamentary body where the German federal states (Lander) participate in legislation
and
administration.
See
BUNDESRAT,
http://www.bundesrat.de/EN/Home/
homepage node.html (last visited May 25, 2012).
35. See Maastricht Ruling, supra note 33, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 71-72 (noting the
various constitutional complaints); see also Makowski, supra note 34, at 165 & n.59
(noting that the complainants brought their suits based on issues such as the right to
form political parties and the maintenance of the separation of powers).

1554 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 35:1543
permit amendments to the basic principles contained in Articles
1 and 20.36 Article 1 addresses human rights and dignity and
Article 20 describes Germany as a democratic and social federal
state. 37 Although the Court rejected most claims brought against
the ratification, the BVerfG did rule on the potential violation of
Article 38, which gives individuals standing to claim a loss of the
democratic principles protected by Article 20.38 In acceding to
the European Union, the Bundestag, had surrendered some of
its traditional powers.3 9 This transfer of power called into
question Germany's status as a sovereign state, and the
democratic rights of the German people guaranteed by a
40
democratic state.
The complaint brought in the Maastricht Ruling also
suggested that by ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, Germany
would have committed itself to a path that ultimately would end
with a disruption of the core principles protected under Article
41
20, even if there were no constitutional violations at present.
36. See Maastricht Ruling, supra note 33, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 74-75; see also
Makowski, supra note 34, at 161 (noting that the focus of the arguments against the
treaty came from Article 79(3)). Known as the eternity clause, Article 79(3) provides:
"Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Ldnder,
their participation in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1
and 20 shall be inadmissible." GRUNDGESETZ art. 79(3) (Ger.).
37. GRUNDGESETZ arts. 1, 20 (Ger.).
38. See Maastricht Ruling, supra note 33, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 63-64. Article 38
guarantees the rights of citizens to vote for the Bundestag. See GRUNDGESETZ art. 38
(Ger.); see also Makowski, supra note 34, at 165-66 (noting that Article 38 gives standing
for claimants to show a violation of fundamental democratic principles protected by
Article 20).
39. See Gesetz zum Vertrag vom 7. Februar 1992 uiber die Europaische Union of
28 December 1992 (BGB1 II, S 1251); see also MATrHIAS RUMPF & MICHAEL POPP,
GERMAN BUNDESTAG PUB. RELATIONS Div., THE BUNDESTAG AND EUROPE: THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS IN PARLIAMENT 3 (Klemens Vogel et al. eds.,

2007) (explaining that the Maastricht Treaty transferred monetary policy and many
aspects of economic policy from the Bundestag); Makowski, supra note 34, at 161
(noting that the European Union areas of competence had been expanded to include
transportation and social issues as well as security and justice policy).
40. See Makowski, supra note 34, at 162 (explaining that if enough sovereign
powers are transferred, the government may lose its status as a fully functioning state);
see also Wiegandt, supra note 34, at 893 (noting that because the Bundestag was
relinquishing some of its powers, the BVerfG opened itself to scrutinizing the treaty
compliance with protected democratic principles).
41. See Maastricht Ruling, supra note 33, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 75 (noting the
complaint that accession to the European Union introduces the covert and irrevocable
institution of a European federal state and that the creation of a monetary union will
make the European Union irreversible); see also Makowski, supra note 34, at 163
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Part of this concern was that a functioning monetary union
would require Germany to relinquish control of its ability to set
42
financial policy.
The BVerfG held that European institutions alone did not
yet satisfy the democratic principle protected by the GG and
therefore, the Bundestag had to maintain substantial power and
influence as the instrument able to protect the German right to
democracy. 43 The ruling determined that the Bundestag was not
deprived of sufficient control such that it lost its sovereignty or
its ability to protect the democratic principle of the German
state articulated in Article 20 of the GG. 44 The BVerfG also
noted that the treaty did not commit Germany to any further
transfers of control without further approval. 45 The powers that
had been assigned to the European Union were not
constitutionally protected, and Germany was not committing
itself to any further European integration outside the approval
of proper government bodies. 46 When considering the future
implications of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, the Court
determined that the necessity of a full economic union was a
(articulating the argument that if the Maastricht Treaty did not disturb the
constitutional core at present, it would do so in the future).
42. See Makowski, supra note 34, at 164 (indicating the concern that Germany
would have to surrender budgetary powers to successfully operate the monetary
union); see also Wiegandt, supra note 34, at 904 (noting that the BVerfG contends that
entering into the monetary union impedes on the essence of the GG).
43. See Maastricht Ruling, supra note 33, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 87-88, 91 (noting
that EC institutions were limited in their functions and powers because they did not
satisfy democratic rights of the people and that the Bundestag retained sufficient
influence as a democratic body).
44. See Maastricht Ruling, supra note 33, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 84, 91 (indicating
that Germany's accession to the European Union has not violated its democratic
principle or compromised its sovereignty); see also Steve J. Boom, The European Union
After the MaastrichtDecision: "Will Germany be the 'Virginia of Europe?,'43Am. J. COMP. L.
177, 183 n.27 (1995) (noting that the court found that the Bundestag retained
sufficient competences); Makowski, supra note 34, at 167 (noting the Court's decision
that the Bundestag retained sufficient control to protect democratic rights).
45. See Maastricht Ruling, supra note 33, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 97-98 (noting the
approval needed for further transfers); see also Makowski, supra note 34, at 167 (stating
that the BVerfG ruled that the Maastricht Treaty did not commit Germany to any
further transfers of control without further approval).
46. See MaastrichtRuling, supra note 33, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 84 (noting that there
was no constitutional breach by acceding to the European Union and further functions
and powers of the European Union are subject to the approval of the national
parliaments); see also Makowski, supra note 34, at 167 (indicating that the Bundestag
retained enough power to satisfy the democratic principle in Article 79(3) of the GG).
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political question, and that the Court could rule on the legality
47
of such a union if the issue ever arose.
In the Maastricht Ruling, the BVerfG was able to conclude
that the amount of power Germany was transferring to Europe
was constitutionally acceptable at that time. 48 As with the two
Solange cases, the Maastricht Ruling upheld German
constitutional rights but allowed the EC to gain more power as
long as it did so within the confines of the BVerfG's
interpretation

of the GG. 49 In

the

Maastricht Ruling, the

conditional approval of the treaty suggested that the European
Parliament would need to be strengthened to protect the
democratic rights of the people if the Bundestag was ever to
50
surrender more powers to the European Union.
2. The Signing of the Treaty of Lisbon
In 2009, when EU Member States were ratifying the Treaty
of Lisbon, the same constitutional controversy over fundamental
rights resurfaced. 51 Complaints were filed stating that ratification
entailed a violation of democratic principles because the
transfer of powers to the European Union made the legislature
less relevant to the decisions that would affect the German

47. See Maastricht Ruling, supra note 33, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 103 (determining
that an economic union could be decided on at a later date); see also Makowski, supra
note 34, at 168 (noting the BVerfG's decision that entering the monetary union did not
ultimately mean that Germany would have tojoin a full economic union).
48. See MaastrichtRuling, supra note 33, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 84 (noting that the
scope of powers and functions granted to the European Union do not at present
breach the GG).
49. See Makowski, supranote 34, at 174 (noting the resemblance of the Maastricht
Ruling to the previous Solange cases); see also Wiegandt, supra note 34, at 900 (indicating
that the BVerfG passed the Maastricht treaty as constitutional but only by interpreting it
narrowly).
50. See Maastricht Ruling, supra note 33, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 86-88 (indicating
that the European Parliament plays a necessary role in democratic support and its
influence could eventually be a part of democratic legitimization in the European
Union); see also Wieland, supra note 34, at 265 (asserting that the Court emphasized the
possible future importance of the democratic process and European Parliament in
further steps of integration); Makowski, supra note 34, at 174 (noting that the
Maastricht Ruling gave Germany greater influence on future negotiations involving an
expansion of the role of the European Parliament).
51. BVerfG, June 30, 2009, 123 BVERFGE 267 (Ger.), [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 13
[hereinafter Lisbon Ruling]; see Giegerich, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that the central
application filed in the suit indicated a violation of individual fundamental rights).
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people. 52 In its ruling ("Lisbon Ruling"), the Court again looked
to whether the treaty transferred too many powers to the
European Union, whether it failed to provide the European
Union with sufficient democratic legitimacy, and whether
Germany's diminished sovereignty reduced the country to a
mere canton of a European federal state. 53 The Court avoided
ruling that any provision of the treaty was unconstitutional, and
instead only found fault with the process of ratification since it
54
lacked the participation of both the Bundestag and Bundesrat.
On the issue of German sovereignty, the Court ruled that for
Germany to join a federal state, it would have to be a decision of
the people, not just a body acting on behalf of Germany. 55 The
BVerfG claimed the power to review EU law already in force,
and to declare those provisions inapplicable to Germany if they
were found incompatible with the GG. 56 Furthermore, the Court
reserved for itself the ability of ultra vires review to determine if
the European bodies remained within the boundaries of the

52. See Lisbon Ruling, supra note 51, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. at 322 (acknowledging the
constitutional complaint addressed by the BverfG); see also Giegerich, supra note 5, at
11 (noting that the complaint argued that the right to vote for parliament had been
interfered with since some of the Bundestag's powers had been transferred to the
European Union). The democratic principles are laid out in Article 20. See
GRUNDGESETZ art. 20(1)-(2) (Ger.). The right to vote is found in Articles 38 and 93.
See id. arts. 38, 93(1), 93(4a).
53. See Lisbon Ruling, supra note 51, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. at 322 (noting the aspects
of the treaty that the BVerfG reviewed); see also Giegerich, supra note 5, at 14
(indicating the three respects in which the Court reviewed the treaty).
54. See Lisbon Ruling, supra note 51, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. at 346-47, 381-82
(indicating that the BVerfG found that the Act approving the Treaty of Lisbon did not
violate the GG but the Extending Act, which allowed ratification, did not accord to the
Bundestag and the Bundesrat sufficient rights of participation in European lawmaking); see also Giegerich, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that the Court did not rule that
the treaty itself violated the GG).
55. Lisbon Ruling, supra note 51, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. at 334 ("The Basic Law does
not grant powers to bodies acting on behalf of Germany to abandon the right of selfdetermination of the German people in the form of Germany's sovereignty under
international law by joining a federal state. Due to the irrevocable transfer of
sovereignty to a new subject of legitimation that goes with it, this step is reserved to the
directly declared will of the German people alone.").
56. Lisbon Ruling, supra note 51, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. at 338 (noting the BVerfG's
identity review can declare certain EU laws inapplicable in Germany); see also
Giegerich, supra note 5, at 23 (indicating that identity review allows the Court to review
treaty provisions already in force and declare them inapplicable, thus disregarding the
primacy of EU law).
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powers conferred upon them by the treaty. 57 Although the
Lisbon Ruling contains passages that praise EU integration and
that indicate the openness of the GG towards it, the Court
placed conditions and constitutional limits that ultimately
58
reserved power for Germany.
C. The European Economic Crisis
The genesis of the monetary union allowed members of
economically weaker countries to benefit from lower long-term
interest rates and greater access to credit than was previously
available to them. 59 The Maastricht Treaty established rules
regarding the debt-to-GDP ratio of Eurozone members, but
60
members often disregarded or inaccurately reported them.
57. Lisbon Ruling, supra note 51, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. at 337-38 (noting that the
Court retained ultra vires review); see also Giegerich, supra note 5, at 25 (noting that the
Court would review whether European institutions kept within the bounds of the
sovereign power conferred upon them).
58. Lisbon Ruling, supra note 51, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. at 333, 336, 342 (noting that
the GG calls for European integration); see also Giegerich, supra note 5, at 42 (noting
that the judgment contains passages that praise the EU project).
59. See Ferry Batzoglou et al., Die Geldbombe, 39 DER SPIEGEL 56, Sept. 26, 2011
(noting that the euro allowed weaker countries to look like better investments). A
translation in English is available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/
0,1518,790138,00.html. See also Turk, supra note 15, at 412-13 (noting that periphery
states had access to lower long-term interest and more credit because of the euro);
Kash Mansori, Wy Greece, Spain, and Ireland Aren't to Blame for Europe's Woes, NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 2011, http://www.tnr.com/article/economy/95989/eurozonecrisis-debt-dont-blame-greece (indicating the euro made it easier for money to flow to
capital-poor countries that offered high returns on investments).
60. See Turk, supra note 15, at 412, 414 (noting that members cheated on the
Stability and Growth Pact requirements, even France and Germany). For entry into the
euro, a Member State had to meet the Maastricht criteria-meaning debt had to be
below sixty percent of GDP and the budget deficit below three percent of GDP as well
as specific conditions relating to price stability, interest rates, and exchange rates. See A
Plain Guide to Eurojargon, EUROPA-EUROJARGON, http://europa.eu/abc/eurojargon/
index en.htm (last visited May 25, 2012) (stating the criteria needed for entry into the
euro). These are based in Article 121(1) of the Treaty on European Union ("TEU").
See Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, art. 104c(2), 1992 O.J.
C 191/1, at 13 [hereinafter Maastricht TEU]. The political push for the new euro and
the trust of European countries to supply their own financial data allowed Greece to
join even though its initial debt and deficit numbers were above those required for
entry. See Batzoglou et al., supra note 59 (noting that Greece manipulated economic
figures used to join the Eurozone); see also Ekin Inal, The Recent Greek Crisis:Harbingerof
a New Contagion?,16 COLUM.J. EUR. L. ONLINE 95 (2010), http://www.cjel.net/online/
16_3-inal/ (indicating the Greece was admitted into the Eurozone by falsifying its
economic records).
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European Banks invested heavily in Eurozone government
bonds, which seemed to bear a low risk of default. 61 Afterjoining
the Eurozone, many economically weaker Eurozone countries,
like Greece, began borrowing low-interest money from northern
Europe. 62 Since Eurozone countries are able to establish their
own fiscal policies, without enforced monitoring, several
Eurozone countries spent the last ten years incurring too much
debt. 63 Greece's economy also was burdened by significant
government corruption, such as local bureaucracies that were
overbearing on business and a culture of tax evasion that kept
64
government coffers empty.

61. See Batzoglou et al., supra note 59 (noting that European banks invested in
Eurozone government bonds because they seemed to be a secure investment); see also
Times Topics: European Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/european-sovereign-debt crisis/index.html
(last updated June 19, 2012) (indicating that European banks invested heavily in
government bonds).
62. See Times Topics: European Debt Crisis, supra note 61 (asserting that Greece took
advantage of easy money to drive up borrowing); see also Batzoglou et al., supra note 59
(noting that weaker Eurozone members were effectively borrowing the credit rating of
stronger members); Julie Creswell & Graham Bowley, Ratings Firms Misread Signs of
Greek Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011, at Al (noting that the credit agencies judged
Greek debt as investment grade for the last decade missing signs of trouble and that the
market was scarcely differentiating between the different Eurozone members); Justin
Fox, Echoes of Greece's Debt Crisis, TIME, Feb. 22, 2010, at 24 (stating that Greece's new
reliable currency allowed it to borrow at lower interest rates than before).
63. See Turk, supra note 15, at 406 (noting that Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain
faced similar difficulties as Greece with increased deficit and debt projections resulting
in credit downgrades); see also Cody Edwards, What Is the European Financial Stability
Facility?, UNIV.
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2011),

http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/uicifd-ebook/european-financial-stability-facilityand-european-stabilization-mechanism (noting the Eurozone members' ability to
overspend and under-tax allowed them to incur large deficits); Chris Gaffney, EU
Pushes for a More Perfect Fiscal Union, DAILY RECKONING (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://dailyreckoning.com/eu-pushes-for-a-more-perfect-fiscal-union/
(stating that as
of May 2011 only four of the Eurozone countries were below the debt-to-GDP ratio set
by the Maastricht Treaty, and that Germany was not one of them).
64. See Turk, supra note 15, at 408 (noting the tax evasion epidemic in the
Mediterranean countries); see also Stavros Katsios, The Shadow Economy and Corruption in
Greece, 1 SOUTH-EASTERN FUR. J. ECON. 61, 78 (2006) (noting that in Greece
"entrepreneurs go underground... to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and
corruption"); Batzoglou et al., supra note 59 (indicating that Greece's government had
problems with corruption, overbearing bureaucracies, and tax collection); James
Surowiecki, Dodger Mania, NEW YORKER, July 11, 2011, at 38 (asserting the large gap
between what Greek tax payers owed and what they paid, as well as their ability to bribe
tax officials).
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In 2008, after the global financial services firm Lehman
Brothers collapsed due to its investment in worthless securities,
rating agencies began to question the quality of government
bonds. 65 In January 2009, Standard and Poor's ("S&P"), a global
66
credit rating agency, began downgrading Greek bonds.
Creditors to Greece began demanding higher interests rates to
compensate for the risk that Greece would not be able to pay
back its debts. 67 The higher borrowing costs had made it
impossible for Greece to grow itself out of debt. 68 The fact that
Greece used the euro also made it impossible for the state to
69
devalue its currency in order to foster competition.
Europe's banks had invested considerable amounts of
money not only in Greece, but also in other crisis-stricken
65. See Batzoglou et al., supra note 59 (noting that rating agencies began to
question government bonds after the collapse of Lehman Brothers); see also George
Soros, The Crisis and the Euro, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 19, 2010, at 28 (stating that the
first clear reminder that the Eurozone did not have a common treasury came after the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and that afterward, markets began to worry about the
accumulation of sovereign debt).
66. See Batzoglou et al., supra note 59 (noting that Standard & Poor's ("S&P")
downgraded Greek bonds in January 2009); see also Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Greek
Crisis Deepens as S&P Downgrades Sovereign Debt, TELEGRAPH (U.K), Jan. 14, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/4242070/Greek-crisis-deepens-asSandP-downgrades-sovereign-debt.html
(indicating that S&P downgraded Greek
bonds). S&P is a credit ratings agency that gives opinions about credit risk, meaning an
issuer's willingness and ability to meet its financial obligations, and rates the issuer with
a letter grade rank between AAA and D. See STANDARD & POOR'S, GUIDE TO CREDIT
RATING ESSENTIALS: WHAT ARE RATINGS & How Do THEY WORK? 3 (2011), available at

http://img.en25.com/Web/StandardandPoors/SPCreditRatingsGuide.pdf.
67. See Batzoglou et al., supra note 59 (noting that creditors to Greece demanded
higher interest rates on Greek bonds); see also Times Topics: Greece, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/greece/
index.html (last updated June 20, 2012) ("Throughout 2010 and 2011, investors
continued to demand ever higher interest rates for Greek borrowing as the market
appeared to conclude that some sort of default was inevitable.").
68. See Batzoglou et al., supra note 59 (stating that the higher interest rates made
it almost impossible for Greece to grow itself out of debt); see alsoJack Ewing, German
Court Ruling Could Complicate Euro Zone Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/business/global/german-court-ruling-couldcomplicate-euro-zone-decisions.html (noting that as the European economy slows, it
reduces the chances that the region can grow itself out of the crisis).
69. See Turk, supra note 15, at 409 (noting that because the euro is controlled by
the ECB rather than Member States, the members do not have the power to devalue
the currency); see also Batzoglou et al., supra note 59 (indicating that Greece could not
devalue its currency to make it more competitive); Kabir Chibber, How Might Greece
Leave the Euro?, BBC NEWS, Nov. 3, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business15575751 (noting Greece is unable to devalue its currency).
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countries, leading to concern that a Greek default would result
in contagion. 70 Moreover, Greece's inability to pay off its debts
raised concerns that other Eurozone countries with large debts
and deficits would also be unable to pay off their debts. 71 In an
effort to stabilize the market, the European Central Bank
("ECB"), acting as a stronghold for the euro's stability, began
buying up Greek bonds, as well as those of Ireland, Portugal,
and Spain, which were also overextended in their sovereign
debt. 72 In April 2010, S&P lowered Greek bonds to junk status,

and other major credit rating agencies soon followed. 73 In
response to the concern about government debt and desiring to
"restore confidence and safeguard financial stability in the Euro
area," European leaders and the International Monetary Fund
("IMF") provided Greece with a EUC110 billion bailout in May
2010 conditioned upon Greece implementing austerity

70. See Batzoglou et al., supra note 59 (asserting that because banks had invested
heavily in the bonds of weak Eurozone countries, there was fear that a Greek default
would lead to contagion); see also David Wroe, What Happens If a Country Goes Bust?,
GLOBAL POST, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/business-tech/debt-crisis/
110719/euro-zone-sovereign-debt-crisis-banks (last visited May 25, 2012) (noting that
because of the debt owned by European banks, a Greek default could spark
contagion).
71. See Edwards, supra note 63 (indicating that the fear of Greece defaulting lead
to the fear that other struggling countries would also default); see also Landon Thomas,
Jr. & Stephen Castle, Heads of Europe Back Broad Plan to Rescue Greece, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2011, at Al (noting that a Greek default would cause contagion to spread because
bondholders would unload bonds from other troubled Eurozone members).
72. See Batzoglou et al., supra note 59 (noting that the ECB had purchased the
bonds of struggling Eurozone members in order to stabilize the bond market); see also
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, ECB Must Buy 'Hundreds of Billions' of Bonds to Tame Europe's
Debt Crisis, TELEGRAPH (U.K), June 17, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
comment/ambroseevanspritchard/7836652/ECB-must-buy-hundred-of-billions-ofbonds-to-tame-Europes-debt-crisis.html (stating that in April 2010 the ECB bought
Greek, Irish, and Portuguese bonds to help buttress the European Financial Stability
Facility). The ECB is the central bank for the euro and its task is to maintain the euro's
purchasing power and price stability. See EUR. CENTRAL BANK, http://www.ecb.int/
ecb/html/index.en.html (last visited May 25, 2012).
73. See Turk, supra note 15, at 405 (indicating that S&P lowered Greek bonds to
junk status in April 2010); see also Batzoglou et al., supra note 59 (asserting that the
major credit agencies had reduced Greek bonds to junk status by June 2010); John
Blau & Nigel Tandy, EU Commission Slams US Rating Agency over Greek junk' Status,
DEUTSCHE
WELLE,
June
15,
2010,
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/
0,,5686135,00.html (noting that Moody's, a bond credit rating business, slashed
Greece's sovereign debt rating to junk status).

1562 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 35:1543
measures.7 4 Civil unrest and labor strikes occurred because of
austerity measures put in place to liberalize the labor market
75
and change the essence of the Greek economy.
To calm financial markets, the European Union created the
European Financial Stability Facility ("EFSF") and the European
Financial Stabilization Mechanism ("EFSM") in May 2010 to
control the spread of sovereign debt.76 This financial safety net,
protecting troubled nations from a sudden default, totals
EUC750 billion, with EUC500 billion coming from the European
Union and EUC250 billion from the IMF.77 The lending capacity
of the EFSF is EUC440 billion, which it would achieve by selling

74. See Gott, supra note 7, at 204 (noting that Greece received bailout money from
the European Financial Stability Facility ("EFSF") in May 2010 because of its budget
deficits and escalated borrowing costs); see also Edwards, supra note 63 (stating that
Eurozone leaders and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") granted a bailout to
Greece in order to ensure the financial stability to the Eurozone); Times Topics: Greece,
supra note 67 (noting that Greece received a bailout package in return for
implementing austerity measures in an effort to restore investor confidence).
75. See Batzoglou et al., supra note 59 (noting that liberalizing truck licenses in
Greece caused people to lose their lifetime investments and led to protests and strikes);
see also Anousha Sakoui, Terrorism: Source of Next Attacks Defies Easy Prediction,FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/fe950c80-0303-1 lel-899a00144feabdc.html#axzzlhwXdzNuY (asserting that Greece has seen violent protest in
response to austerity measures).
76. See, e.g., HELEN HAWORTH ET AL., CREDIT SUISSE, EFSF (R)EVOLUTION 3

(2011),
available at https://research-and-analytics.csfb.com/docView?language=
ENG&format=PDF&document-id=804326740&sourceid=em&serialid=OtY9EhZvgwxb
53tmOyt21DVQZpT6XNymEqnLTTSYhIO%3D (acknowledging the creation of the
EFSF);

see also EUROPEAN

FINANCIAL

STABILITY FACILITY,

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL

STABILITY FACILITY FAQS 1 (2011), available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/
attachments/faq en.pdf (noting the date when the EFSF was incorporated). The
European Financial Stability Mechanism ("EFSM") allows the European Commission
to borrow up to EUC60 billion to lend to financially troubled Eurozone members.
European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/
economy-finance/eu-borrower/efsm/index en.htm (last update May 2, 2012) (noting
the structure of the EFSM). The EFSF is the larger of the two facilities that considered
more important. See ANNE SIBERT, DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES,
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, IP/A/ECON/FWC/2009_040/C, THE EFSM & THE EFSF:
Now & WHAT FOLLOWS, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL

POLICIES 2 (2010) (noting that the EFSF is potentially the most important facility).
77. See EUROPEAN FINANCIAL STABILITY FACILITY, PRESENTATION

(Oct. 2011),

available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf presentation-en.pdf (noting
the basic design of the EFSF and the funding available to it); see also EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL STABILITY FACILITY FAQs, supra note 76, at 1 (noting the structure of the
EFSF and the amount of money it can lend).
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debt in capital markets under the guarantees of Member States
78
and by lending the proceeds to Eurozone countries in need.
After Greece received its bailout, Ireland and Portugal soon
followed, tapping the EFSF funds. 79 In July 2011, Greece
required a second bailout.80 The ECB also has bought EUE115.5
81
billion in government bonds to keep borrowing costs down.
While the EFSF is capable of bailing out countries with relatively
small economies, there is a serious concern that the funds
available to the EFSF would not be able to support a bigger
economy such as Italy or Spain. 82 Although the ECB has been
purchasing some Eurozone government bonds, pressure has
been building for the ECB to play a bigger role in supporting
83
troubled Eurozone members.
78. See EUROPEAN FINANCIAL STABILITY FACILITY, supra note 77 (noting the
lending capacity of the EFSF); see also Edwards, supra note 63 (noting how the EFSF
would raise funds used to bail out Eurozone countries).
79. See Times Topics: European Financial Stability Facility and European Stability
Mechanism, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
organizations/e/european financial stability-facility/index.html (last updated June
11, 2012) (noting the EFSF bailout of Ireland and Portugal); see also HAWORTH ET AL.,
supra note 76, at 9 (describing the bailouts to Ireland and Portugal).
80. See Luke Baker & Julien Toyer, Europe Agrees Sweeping New Action on Debt Crisis,
REUTERS, July 21, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/21/us-eurozoneidUSTRE7615X620110721 (noting the agreement to give Greece a second bailout); see
also Times Topics: Greece, supra note 67 (indicating that European leaders agreed on a
second bailout for Greece in July 2011).
81. See OPEN EUR., THE KARLSRUHE FACTOR: WHAT WILL THE GERMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULING MEAN FOR THE EUROZONE CRISIS? 2 (2011), available
at http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/Karlsruhefactor.pdf (acknowledging the
EUCI 15.5 billion worth of bonds that the ECB bought in order to stabilize borrowing
costs); see also Marc Jones, Politics, Markets to Test ECB's Bond-Buying Appetite, REUTERS,
Sept. 5, 2011,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/09/05/uk-ecb-bonds-idUKLN
E78403020110905 (indicating that, as of August 25, 2011, the ECB bought EUl115.5
billion of government bonds).
82. See DANIEL GROS & THOMAS MAYER, DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL
POLICIES, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, IP/A/ECON/NT/2011-04, POLICY DEPARTMENT A:
ECONOMIC & SCIENTIFIC POLICIES; HOW TO BACK UP THE RESCUE FUND? 6 (2011)

(recognizing Italy and Spain as "too big to fail" and "too big to be saved"); see also Gott,
supra note 7, at 205 (indicating that if a country as large as Italy or Spain needed
rescuing, there might not be enough funds to cover its deficit).
83. See, e.g., ECB Increases Purchaseof Sovereign Bonds, MONEY NEWS, Jan. 2, 2012,
http://www.moneynews.com/FinanceNews/ecb-bond-euro/2012/O1/02/id/422776
(noting that France and Italy have urged the ECB to increase purchases to hold down
elevated borrowing costs for indebted Eurozone countries); see also Jack Ewing, Bank
ChiefHints Help for Europe is Possible, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2011, at BI (reporting that ECB
President Mario Draghi suggested the ECB could increase support if the Eurozone
leaders took more steps to enforce spending discipline); Sakari Suoninen & Eva
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The EFSF and EFSM are only temporary institutions that
will stop issuing new bailout programs afterJune 30, 2013.84 The
Eurozone members have signed a treaty to establish a
permanent stability mechanism known as the European Stability
85
Mechanism ("ESM"), which will replace the EFSF and EFSM.
The treaty was originally signed in July 2011, but was modified in
February 2012.86 The ESM will have the ability to issue loans in
an emergency situation on a majority of eighty-five percent of
the votes cast. 87 The treaty will have to be ratified by at least
ninety percent of the Member States, and is expected to enter
into force in July 2012.88
II. THE B VERFG'S RESPONSE TO THE GERMAN BAILOUTS
AND THE RULING'S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
As the economic crisis in the Eurozone unfolded, Member
States provided funds and guarantees to protect other Eurozone
Kuehnen, Pressurefor Bigger ECB Role in Crisis Must End: Weidmann, REUTERS, Nov. 14,
2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/201 1/1 1/14/us-ecb-weidmann-idUSTRE7ADOR
Z20111114 (stating that Prime Minister Cameron, President Obama, and Prime
Minister Putin have called for the ECB to take a bigger role in resolving the crisis).
84. See EUROPEAN FINANCIAL STABILrTY FACILITY FAQS, supra note 76, at 4
(indicating that the EFSF is a temporary institution that will not enter any new
programs afterJune 30, 2013); see also Edwards, supranote 63 (noting that the EFSF has
a three-year life span that ends in 2013).
85. See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism pmbl. 1, Feb. 1,
2012 (not yet ratified), available at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/
582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf [hereinafter ESM Treaty] (noting that the European
Stability Mechanism ("ESM"), once it comes into effect, is a permanent stability
mechanism meant to replace the EFSF and EFSM).
86. See European Stability Mechanism Signed, EUROPEAN COUNCI (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.european-council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/european-stabilitymechanism-treaty-signed?lang=en (noting that the ESM was originally signed in July
2011 but was modified and resigned in February 2012); see also Treaty Establishing the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Signed, EUR. COMMISSION (July 11, 2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/articles/financial-operations/2011-07-1 1-esmtreaty-en.htm (noting the ESM treaty was originally signed inJuly 2011).
87. See ESM Treaty, supra note 85, art. 4(4) (noting that in an emergency voting
procedure decisions can be made on eighty-five percent of the votes cast); see also
European Stability Mechanism Signed, supra note 86 (stating that in situations where a
failure to urgently adopt a decision jeopardizes the stability of the Eurozone, the
decision may be taken by eighty-five percent of the votes cast).
88. See ESM Treaty, supra note 85, art. 48(1) (indicating that ninety percent of the
members have to ratify the treaty for it to come into force); see also European Stability
Mechanism Signed, supra note 86 (noting that the ESM is expected to enter into force in
July 2012).
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members from defaulting.8 9 After Germany began contributing
to the rescue fund, the question of German constitutional rights
in relation to interests of the European Union again resurfaced.
Part II.A discusses the constitutional complaints brought to the
BVerfG concerning the legality of Germany providing bailout
funds for other Eurozone members, specifically focusing on the
Sept. 7 Ruling by the BVerfG. Part II.B analyzes the ruling's
implications for further German action in resolving the euro
crisis.
A. The Sept. 7 Ruling
In May 2010, a group of euro-skeptics filed complaints in
the BVerfG, challenging Germany's participation in funding the
bailouts of Greece and other troubled Eurozone nations, as well
as Germany's possible accession to the ESM. 90 The complainants
challenged the rescue packages on the grounds that they were
in conflict with EU treaty provisions that prohibit one Member
State from taking on the debt of another Member and the ECB

89. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (noting that Eurozone members
have contributed funding to the EFSF and that it has already been used to provide
emergency bailout loans).
90. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17 (outlining the constitutional complaints
brought before the Court prior to rendering its judgment); see also DEUTSCHE BANK
RESEARCH, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINTS: GERMAN REJECTION OF RESCUE PACKAGES
UNLIKELY 2-4, 6 (2011), available at http://www.dbresearch.info/PROD/DBR_
INTERNET EN-PROD/PRODOOOO0000271154/Constitutional+complaints%3A+
German+rejection+of+rescue+packages+unlikely.pdf (noting that the complaint was
extended to cover the ESM); OPEN EUR., supra note 81, at 2-4 (noting that the
complaints addressed German participation in the bailouts and the ESM); Press
Release, BVerfG, No.37/2011, Mfindliche Verhandlung in Sachen "GriechenlandHilfe/Euro-Rettungsschirm"
(June
9,
2011),
available
at
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvgl 1-037.html;;
German Court
Seen Approving EU Bailouts, with Conditions, EuRACTIVE.COM (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/german-court-Seen-approving-eu-bailoutsconditions-news-507294 (reporting the challenge to the bailouts). The euro-skeptics
include conservative member of the Bundestag, Peter Gauweiler, and five professors
who have previously challenged German integration into the European Union. See
Dietmar Hipp & Ralf Neukirch, Court to Give Bundestag Bigger Say in Bailouts, SPIEGEL
ONLINE, Sept. 5, 2011,
http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/europe/0,1518,78
4442,00.html (noting that the challenge was mounted by Peter Gauweiler and a group
of professors); see also OPEN EUR., supra note 81, at 6. A complaint also was filed by the
Europolis Group made up of fifty-five prominent German academics and business
leaders. See OPEN EUR., supra note 81, at 6.
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from directly purchasing debt instruments. 9a While the violation
of EU treaties was one argument brought before the Court, the
primary challenge brought to the BVerfG was that the bailouts
were unconstitutional under the GG.92 The complaints raised
several arguments and used various lines of reasoning to assert a
constitutional breach. 93 The main arguments were that
Germany's role in the bailouts and participation in the EFSF 1)
limited the role of the Bundestag in key decisions involving
public money and thus violated the constitutional principles of
democracy and election law, and 2) fostered inflationary
tendencies thereby negatively impinging on the German
91. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17, 1 40-44 (noting the complaints addressing
violation of the EU treaties). Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union ("TFEU"), known as the "no-bailout clause," states that "[a] Member
State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments,
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or
public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial
guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project." Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 125(1), 2010 OJ. C 83/47, at 99
[hereinafter TFEU]. Article 123 of the TFEU states:
Overdraft facilities or any other type of facility with the European Central
Bank or with the central banks of other Member States ... in favor of Union
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local
or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public
undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase
directly from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks
of debt instruments.
Id. art. 123(1), at 99. The ECB also is prohibited from seeking or taking instructions
from any EU institution, agency, or government of a Member State. Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on European Union, Protocol (No 4): On the Statute of the
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank art. 7, 2010 O.J.
C 83/230, at 232; see OPEN EUR., supra note 81, at 2 (recognizing the complaint as to
the violation of the "no-bailout clause" and the ECB's violation of its statute); see also
DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH, supra note 90, at 3-4 (noting that the complaints
addressed potential violations of the European Union's no-bailout clause and the ECB
bond purchasing program).
92. See Press Release, BVerfG, No.37/2011, supra note 90; see also AUGHNE MILLER,
HOUSE

OF COMMONS LIBRARY,

SN/IA/6062,

GERMANY AND THE EURO

RESCUE

AGREEMENTS 9-10 (2011), available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/
SN06062.pdf (recognizing the existence of an argument that the bailout fund had an
inappropriate legal basis and was in violation of EU law, though the BVerfG only
considered the complaints proposing the bailouts were in violation of constitutional
law); OPEN EUR., supra note 81, at 2 (noting that the main challenge of the complaint
was to the legality of the bailouts under the GG).
93. See OPEN EUR., supra note 81, at 2 (noting that the multiple complaints raised
various arguments and lines of reasoning); see also DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH, supra
note 90, at 3-4 (outlining the various arguments used by the complainants to allege a
constitutional breach).
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people's right to property. 94 On July 5, 2011, the Court opened
95
hearings on these issues.
96
On September 7, 2011, the BVerfG reached a decision.
The Court endorsed the legislative acts allowing Germany's
involvement in the bailouts ("Acts") and rejected the idea that
participation violated parliamentary rights. 97 The BVerfG stated
that the bailouts did not result in an excessive burden on the
German budget, constitute a significant transfer of power from
the Bundestag, or negatively impact the euro's purchasing
power. 98 Although the Court noted that the arguments
regarding EU law did not raise reviewable constitutional
complaints, it determined that the ECB's current bond
purchasing was not in violation of EU law and that there was no
violation of the European Union's no-bailout clause, which it

94. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17, 11 32-34 (recognizing the constitutional
complaints regarding rights to democracy and property); see also MILLER, supra note 92,
at 10 (indicating the main constitutional arguments); OPEN EUR., supra note 81, at 2
(noting the main arguments regarding potential violations of the GG). Article 38 of the
GG protects voting citizens from losing competences of the present or a future
Bundestag. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17. The fundamental right to property is
protected by Article 14 of the GG. GRUNDGESETZ art. 14 (Ger.).
95. See OPEN EUR., supra note 81, at 3; see also Annika Breidthardt, German Court
Hears Case Against Euro Bailouts, REUTERS, July 5, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/07/05/us-eurozone-germany-court-idUSTRE76415D20110705
(indicating
when the court opened hearings); Derek Scally, German Court to Hear Euro Bailout
Challenge, IRISH TIMES, July 5, 2011, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/
2011/0705/1224300090884.html (noting that the BVerfG opened hearings on the
complaints on July 5, 2011).
96. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17; see also Mtinchau, supra note 9 (noting that
the Court reached a verdict of seven to one).
97. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17,
133 (stating that the Bundestag did not
dilute its rights to adopt and control the budget and did not disregard the principle of
democracy); see also Matt Zuvela & Nicole Goebel, Germany's Top Court Throws Out AntiEuro Bailout Lawsuit, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Sept. 7, 2011, http://www.dw-world.de/
dw/article/0,,15369145,00.html
(noting that the BVerfG decided "that the
contribution did not violate parliament's right to control spending of taxpayers'
money"). Germany passed two acts relating to the bailouts ("Acts"). The Monetary
Union Financial Stabilization Act granted authorization to provide aid to Greece. The
Euro Stabilization Mechanism Act granted authority to participate in the euro rescue
package. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17, 11 6-12, 19-30.
98. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17 (holding that the bailouts did not violate
conditions set by the Court that would be considered unconstitutional); see also Press
Release, Open Eur., Open Europe Responds to German Constitutional Court Ruling
(Sept. 7, 2011), available at http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Article/Page/en/LIVE?
id=1676 (noting the Court's ruling).
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interpreted broadly.99 Although the ruling approved of the
current rescue packages funded by Germany, the presiding
judge also indicated that there were limits to the amount of aid
that could be given.1 00 The Court made it clear that decisions on
revenue and expenditures remain in the hands of the
Bundestag, and that the Bundestag must remain in control of
fundamental
budget policy
even
in
a
system
of
intergovernmental governance. 1 1 Moreover, the Court ruled
that the government must have the approval of the Bundestag's
budget committee before any more loans could be granted. 102
Section 1.4 of Germany's Euro Stabilization Act had previously
only required the government to strive to reach an agreement
103
with the budget committee before giving guarantees.
As to the Bundestag's ability to grant bailouts, the BVerfG
noted that it will not question the legislature's discretion in the
amount of guarantees it assumes, but that it will review possible
transgressions of ultimate boundaries. 10 4 The ruling stated that
the Bundestag cannot establish permanent mechanisms that
would result in an assumption of liability for other states'
voluntary decisions, particularly if it leads to unpredictable
consequences. 10 5 Therefore, the Bundestag cannot approve of

99. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17,
57, 62-67, 70-71, 84 (noting the Court's
determination that arguments regarding a potential violation of the articles of the
TFEU did not raise a valid constitutional complaint but nevertheless ruling that the
TFEU was not violated).
100. Andreas VoBkuhle, BverfG President, stressed that the verdict "should not be
misinterpreted as a constitutional blank-cheque for further aid-packages." Press
Release, Open Eur., supra note 98; see also Ruling in Greek Aid: German Court Rejects
Challenges to Euro Bailout, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Sept. 7, 2011, http://www.spiegel.de/
international/germany/0,1518,784859,00.html (quoting BverfG President VoBkuhle).
101. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17, 11 121-24.
102. See id.
103. See Gesetz zur Ubernahme von Gewahrleistungen im Rahmen eines
europaischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus [StabMechG] [Law for the transfer of
guarantees in the context of a European stabilization mechanism], May 22, 2010, BGB1.
I at 627, §1, no. 4 (Ger.); see also Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17, 141 (noting that the
government now needed approval of the budget committee but previously the Euro
Stabilization Mechanism Act only indicated the government had to attempt to get
approval).
104. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17,
126, 132 (indicating that the Court will
not decide on how much money can be allocated to bailouts unless it surpasses
ultimate boundaries).
105. See id. 128 (noting what the Court considers to be the ultimate boundaries
of the Bundestag's power).
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any aid package that could lead to an unforeseeable burden on
future parliaments, and it cannot accept the debt liability of
another nation unless it is given increased control over that
nation's fiscal policy. 10 6 In its ruling, the Court stated that, at
present, there is no violation of Article 38 of the GG since there
was no reason to view the bailouts as an irreversible process with
incalculable consequences, but that any future bailout packages
10 7
would need legislative approval.
The BVerfG approved the Acts permitting Germany to
provide aid to Greece and contribute to the EFSF.10 8 In doing so,
the Court noted that the legislation restricts the authorization to
give guarantees with regard to their amount, indicates objectives
of the guarantee and payment modalities, and provides for
conditional policy agreements that secure an influence to the
German government.10 9 The Acts define the authorization to
give guarantees, and the EFSF requires mutual agreement from
Member States, thus both secure a determining influence for
Germany's government and do not overstep the constitutional
boundaries. 110
B. Implications of the Decision
The Sept. 7 Ruling legitimized the German bailout
contributions under German law. The ruling did not deprive the
rescue fund of its largest contributor and thus avoided putting
debt-heavy nations in high risk of default.11 1 The Court is subject
106. See Press Release, Open Eur., supra note 98 (noting that Germany could not
agree to pool national debt unless it were given more power to control of other
nations' fiscal policy); see also Mfunchau, supra note 9 (stating the Bundestag cannot
empower a third party to usurp sovereign power).
107. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17,
74, 141 (noting that Article 38 was not
violated because the Bundestag retained its powers, but the budgetary committee
would need to approve of any further warranties).
108. See id. 119 (noting that the Court did not find the Acts granting the
bailouts to be unconstitutional).
109. See id.
128, 133-40 (stating the reasons why the legislation did not cross
the boundaries set by the Court).
110. See id. (recognizing that the Bundestag can agree to bailouts without
sacrificing constitutionally protected power).
111. See Ewing, supra note 68 (indicating that the Court could have thrown the
euro into chaos by ruling in favor of the challenges to the bailouts, and that Germany is
the rescue fund's largest contributor); see also Ruling in Greek Aid: German Court Rejects
Challenges to Euro Bailout, supra note 100 (noting that the Court approved of the bailout
plan).
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to political and public influence and had they ruled that the
bailouts were illegal, some commentators estimate that it could
have been a disaster for the Eurozone.11 2 The ruling also limited
the ability of EU leaders to freely give funding or take on debt
liabilities when dealing with the crisis, which affects future
1 13
solutions.
Although the bailouts have been approved, the conditions
given by the BVerfG in the Sept. 7 Ruling increase the
probability of default by struggling Member States because the
Bundestag's budget committee now has an effective veto over
future activation of the EFSF.1 14 If the need for bailouts
continues, the Bundestag may not wish to continually support
the EFSF if it believes it is ineffective.1 1 5 A single "no" vote by the
budget committee will now prevent the German government
from providing additional funding and, as the main contributor
to the fund, the loss of German financial support would likely
116
trigger a default.
112. See Oliver Gerstenberg, The People's Court, EUTOPIA L. (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://eutopialaw.com/2011/09/08/the-peoples-court/
(noting
the
dramatic
consequences to the euro if the court invalidated the act allowing the bailouts); see also
OPEN EUR., supra note 81, at 1, 3 (asserting that if the Court did not approve the
bailouts it would be a disaster for the euro, and that the Court is subject to political
influences); Diane Niedernhoefer, German Court to Hear Euro Bailout ChallengeJuly 5,
REUTERS, July 9, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/09/eurozonegermany-idUSLDE7581ZN20110609
(noting that, because of the disastrous
consequences for the European Union and the Court's reputation, the BVerfG had
little choice but to rule against the plaintiffs).
113. See Ruling in Greek Aid, supra note 100 (recognizing that bailout packages
now must be approved from the Bundestag budget committee); see also Mfinchau, supra
note 9 (noting that Eurobonds no longer seem like an option for the Eurozone).
114. See Press Release, Open Eur., supra note 98 (noting the budget committee
has an effective veto over future bailouts); see also Minchau, supranote 9 (commenting
that the increased hurdles for the German government in providing funding makes
default more likely).
115. See Mfinchau, supra note 9 (stating that the budget committee could grow
tired of continually providing bailouts with no results); see also Florian Gathmann &
Philipp Wittrock, Merkel Gambles on Parliamentary Support for Euro Backstop, SPIEGEL
ONLINE, Oct. 25, 2011, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,79384
8,00.html (noting that certain members of the Bundestag have already voted against
EFSF expansion and plan to continue to vote "no"); Merkel Tells MPs to 'Do the Right
Thing'
on
Euro
Bailouts,
EURONEWS
(Sept.
26,
2011,
6:33
PM),
http://www.euronews.net/2011/09/26/merkel-tells-mps-to-do-the-right-thing-on-eurobailouts/ (indicating that voter surveys show that the German public is tiring of their
government's role in bailing out other Eurozone countries).
116. See Muinchau, supra note 9 (noting that a single "no" vote can trigger
default); see also Gerstenberg, supra note 112 (indicating that an initial "no" vote to the
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Moreover, at least one commentator has suggested that the
117
future of the ESM has been called into question by this ruling.
The BVerfG had made clear that it will not accept permanent
liability in large or incalculable amounts, which can be triggered
by the actions of foreign governments. 118 As a permanent
mechanism replacing the EFSF, the ESM could possibly be in
violation of the Sept. 7 Ruling. 119
While the decision may put the ESM on questionable
ground, commentators have suggested that the ruling dismissed
the idea of pooling Eurozone debt under Eurobonds even
though the Court did not specifically mention them. 120 The
Eurobond is a permanent mechanism that would have to be very
substantial in size to be effective and the liabilities and risks to
Germany's credit would be triggered by the actions of other
national governments by how they handle their own domestic
debt. 121 Although the Court's language suggests that adopting
bailouts would have meant the return of German credits already granted, the loss the
bailout fund's AAA credit rating, and the possible demise of the euro).
117. See Mfunchau, supra note 9 (noting that the ESM has become questionable
because of the ruling).
118. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17,
125-28 (asserting that large and
permanent liabilities for other nations would not be constitutionally acceptable); see
also Minchau, supra note 9 (noting the ruling made by the BVerfG on September 7).
119. See HAWORTH ET AL., supra note 76, at 19 (describing the ESM as a
permanent program for the rescue fund); see also Mfunchau, supra note 9 (noting that
the ESM seems to be a permanent mechanism that places large uncontrollable
liabilities on Germany); ESM May Violate Germany's Constitution, CAPITAL (Greece), Feb.
13, 2012, http://english.capital.gr/News.asp?id=1409206 (reporting the notion that
the ESM threatens the German budget in a manner that could be considered
unconstitutional).
120. See Mfunchau, supra note 9 (noting that the idea of Eurobonds seems to be
outside the limits of the ultimate boundaries of the Bundestag); see also Press Release,
Open Eur., supra note 98 (noting that the ruling reinforced the constitutional
restriction on Eurobonds). A Eurobond would combine the debts of all Eurozone
members and make those countries collectively responsible to pay that debt. See Hibah
Yousuf, Wishing for Euro Bonds? Fat Chance., CNN MONEY (Sept. 16, 2011, 3:52 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/15/markets/bondcenter/eurobonds/
index.htm?iid=EL. The Eurobond would bring down the borrowing costs for
economically troubled nations but it would drive up rates in Germany, which currently
has low interest rates. See id.; see also Peter Spiegel, Commission Proposes 'Eurobonds,'FIN.
TIMES (London), Nov. 20, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/da6468de-136f11el-9562-00144feabdc.html#axzzliScbGf00 (noting that Eurobonds could help to
resolve the financial crisis, but also that Germany resists the idea because of the free
rider problem).
121. See Mimchau, supra note 9 (stating that the Eurobond would have to be large
to be effective and that it would constitute a permanent liability triggered by the actions
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Eurobonds would be unconstitutional, its language also suggests
that if Germany were to have a greater say over the fiscal policies
of other states where it has assumed a liability, the bonds may be
122
constitutionally permissible.
This latest ruling by the BVerfG appears to stall further
integration of the European Union. In interviews after the
Sept. 7 Ruling, BverfG President Andreas VoBkuhle stated that
Germany had reached its limit in surrendering any more core
powers to the European Union unless a new German
constitution were created via referendum. 123 Under the present
interpretation of the GG, a plan that strips the Bundestag of
124
further budgetary powers is prohibited.
of other nations); see also Hibah Yousuf, Europe Ups Ante on Eurobonds, CNN MONEY
(Nov. 23, 2011, 11:39 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/23/markets/eurobonds/
index.htm (noting that healthier members are unwilling to support Eurobonds
because it makes them liable without giving them a say in future fiscal actions).
122. See Press Release, Open Eur., supra note 98 (noting that the Court's language
seems to suggest that joint debt liability may be permissible if Germany were given
more control of other nations' fiscal policies). For now, Germany is adamantly opposed
to the idea of Eurobonds. See Siobhan Dowling, Merkel's Plans Won't Fix Europe; Germany
Still Says "NEIN!" to ECB as Last Resort Lender, GLOBALPOST (Dec. 2, 2011, 7:15 AM),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/germany/ 111201/whygermany-says-%E2%80%9Cnein%E2%80%9D-ecb-lender-last-resort
(noting
that
Germany opposes issuing Eurobonds).
123. BverfG President Andreas VoBkuhle stated that politicians do not have the
legal authority to sign away the birthright of the German people without their explicit
consent. See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, German Turmoil over EU Bail-outs as Top Judge
Calls for Referendum, TELEGRAPH (U.K), Sept. 26, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/financialcrisis/8790785/German-turmoil-over-EU-bail-outs-as-top-judge-callsfor-referendum.html ("The sovereignty of the German state is inviolate and anchored
in perpetuity by basic law. It may not be abandoned by the legislature (even with its
powers to amend the constitution) ....There is little leeway left for giving up core
powers to the EU. If one wants to go beyond this limit-which might be politically
legitimate and desirable-then Germany must give itself a new constitution. A
referendum would be necessary. This cannot be done without the people."). An
amendment to the Constitution can be achieved through Article 79(2) of the GG by a
two-thirds vote in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. Article 79(3) prohibits
certain aspects of the GG from being amended and these aspects ultimately can only be
altered when a new constitution is adopted by the German people pursuant to Article
146 of the GG. See GRUNDGESETZ arts. 79(2)-(3), 146 (Ger.). The idea of a completely
revamping the GG via referendum, however, is not a politically easy task. See Miinchau,
supra note 9 (noting that the German people agreeing to abolish their constitution and
transfer sovereign power from Berlin to Brussels is unlikely).
124. See Sept. 7 Ruling, supra note 17, 1 121, 124 (noting that members of
Parliament must remain in control of fundamental budgetary policy decisions); see also
Henry Chu, Germany's Hand Will Be Uppermost as Europe Writes New Fiscal Rules, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2011, at At (noting Chancellor Merkel's statements that under the GG it
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While there are numerous economic theories on how to
solve the current debt crisis, commentators suggest that the root
cause of the crisis comes from a crisis of governance. 125 The
economic failings of the Eurozone may have come from the
inability of some members to control their borrowing and
reform their economies, as well as from the structure of the
Eurozone, which makes it difficult to control the debt of one of
their smallest economies from spreading to the global
economy. 126 In order to address the structural weaknesses of the
current monetary union, some German politicians have begun
to consider introducing constitutional amendments and
amendments to the EU treaties that would correct the
Eurozone's economic weaknesses by forming a more
127
accountable Eurozone with greater control over its Members.
is not possible to have the budget controlled by a European institution); Dietmar Hipp
& Thomas Darnstidt, Der Bundesstaat ist ein Irrtum, 52 DER SPIEGEL 34, Dec. 23, 2011
(reporting BVerfGJudge Di Fabio's opinion that the Sept. 7 Ruling put a constitutional
ban on transferring the Bundestag's power of disposition over revenue and
expenditure). A translation in English is available at http://www.spiegel.de/
international/germany/0,1518,805873,00.html.
125. See Simon Nixon, ECB Can't Fix Euro Zone's Governance Crisis, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 15, 2011, at CIO (indicating the Eurozone faces a governance crisis); see also Paul
De Grauwe, Vat Kind of Governance for the Eurozone?, 214 CENTER EUR. POL'Y STUD.
POL'Y BRIEF, Sept. 2010, at 1 (noting that the Eurozone needs to improve its
governance).
126. See Nixon, supra note 125, at CIO (noting that the instability of the euro
comes both from members inability to control their spending and the Eurozone's
inability to control the debt of members); see also De Grauwe, supra note 125 (asserting
that the Eurozone has a problem in governing itself). The inability to maintain debt
may have been the cause of the current crisis but it is not the only way an economic
crisis can occur. See Clive Crook, EU Pact Could Make Germany's Nightmare Come True,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, (Dec. 13, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://mobile.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-12-14/eu-fiscal-pact-could-make-germany-s-real-nightmare-come-true-clivecrook (noting that fiscal irresponsibility is only one way to get a financial crisis started);
Europe's FiscalPact May Solve Next Crisis, Not This One. View, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 11,
2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-12/europe-s-fiscal-pact-may-solvenext-crisis-not-this-one-view.html (indicating that structural deficits may surge even if
countries have little or no discretion to exceed EU limitations).
127. See Christoph Hickmann et al., Geheimaktion Grundgesetz, 46 DER SPIEGEL 40,
Nov. 14, 2011 (commenting on Chancellor Merkel's plans to amend the GG and the
EU Treaty to give the European Union more fiscal control). A translation in English is
available at http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/europe/0,1518,797584,00.html. See
also Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Fiskalunion Is Worst of All Worlds for Europe, TELEGRAPH
(London), (Dec 4, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/
ambroseevans-pritchard/8934363/Fiskaunion-is-worst-of-all-worlds-for-Europe.htmI
(noting Chancellor Merkel's plans to give the European Union more ability to control
and disciple members who do not stay within debt limits).
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Economic and political maneuvering can be done to hold the
Eurozone together from imminent collapse but long-term
solutions are needed to prevent this instability from causing
128
another crisis.
If a fundamental reform of the Eurozone, which includes a
fiscal union and greater EU control over Members' budgets,
cannot be reached, another possible solution is a change in the
membership of the Eurozone. 129 Many have questioned whether
the breakup of the Eurozone is inevitable. 130 If an economically
weak country like Greece were to leave the Eurozone, its debt
would no longer threaten the stability of the euro and it could
devalue its new currency to become competitive again.131 For the
time being, however, there is no provision in the relevant EU
treaties for a country to exit the euro, nor is there a provision
for a country to be expelled from the euro. 132 Article 50 of the
128. See RAYMONDJ. AHEARN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4141 1, THE FUTURE
OF THE EUROZONE AND U.S. INTERESTS 13 (2011) (indicating that leaders are looking at
various long-term solutions to improve fiscal coordination); see also A Makeshift Solution:
Europe Needs to Find a Long-Term Plan to Solve the Eurozone Crisis, TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
Aug. 8, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/8689013/Amakeshift-solution.html (noting that Europe needs a long-term solution to solve the
crisis); Ben Rooney, Euro Debt Crisis: 'No Solution in Sight, 'CNN MONEY (Sept. 16, 2011,
3:35 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/19/news/international/european-uniondebt crisis/index.htm (stating that European leaders are under intense pressure to
come up with a long-term solution).
129. See, e.g., STEPHANE DEO ET AL., UBS INV. RESEARCH, EURO BREAK-UP-THE

CONSEQUENCES 1 (2011), available at http://bruxelles.blogs.liberation.fr/UBS%20fin%
20de%201'euro.pdf (noting that changing the members of the Eurozone is an option to
solve long-term problem).
130. See, e.g., Martin Banks, Former EU Commissioner Says Break-Up of Euro Is
'Inevitable,' PARLIAMENT (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/
article/newsarticle/former-eu-commissioner-says-break-up-of-euro-is-inevitable/
(indicating that former EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein believes a split up of the
euro is "unavoidable"); see also Hibah Yousuf, Like It or Not, the Euro Is Doomed, CNN
MONEY (Dec. 9, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/12/09/markets/
euro breakup/index.htm (noting groups believe there are too many obstacles in the
way of keeping the currency union together).
131. See Nicholas Kulish, Opposition Grows in Germany to Bailout for Greece, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, at A4 (asserting that the debt of Greece could threaten the rest of
the Eurozone); see also Chibber, supra note 69 (noting that if Greece were in control of
its own currency, it could devalue it to become more competitive).
132. See DEO ET AL., supra note 129, at 4 (noting the reasons why an opt-out clause
was not included in the monetary union were because: 1) such a clause would have
been "seen as a lack of commitment," 2) the clause would have "raised the possibility of
a country exiting," and 3) by not specifying how to exit, "the costs of trying to do so are
significantly

raised");

see also ECON. INTELLIGENCE

UNIT, AFTER 6UROGEDDON?:
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TEU references a withdrawal option for Member States, but this
provision does not mention a simple withdrawal from the
Eurozone. 13 3 Besides the legal difficulties in exiting the
Eurozone, a weak country would be faced with sovereign default,
corporate default, a collapse of international trade, civil
disorder, and a collapse of the domestic banking system as both
investors and citizens withdraw money in a bank run due to the
uncertainties of a new national currency.13 4 An exit from the
euro would not only cause social unrest, but a messy default also
would have serious economic consequences of global recession
and default contagion for banks and other troubled Eurozone
135
countries.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BREAK-UP OF THE EURO ZONE 3 (2011)

(noting that no formal mechanism exists for a country to be expelled from the
Eurozone or to leave of its own volition); Polly Curtis, What Happens if Greece Leaves the
Euro?, GUARDIAN (U.K), Nov. 3, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/realitycheck-with-polly-curtis/2011/nov/03/greece-bankruptcy-eurozone-exit#A
(indicating
that currently there is no legal way to exit the Eurozone nor a provision in the current
EU treaties to expel a country).
133. Article 50 states that a withdrawal comes from the Member State's initiative
and willingness, which therefore provides no basis for an expulsion. Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 50, 2010 OJ. C 83/13, at 53-54
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]. Moreover, Article 50 provides no details on how an exit
would occur, it only gives the seceding Member State the option to negotiate its exit. Id.
Finally, Article 50 deals with an exit from the European Union, not the Eurozone,
suggesting that to leave the monetary union, a member would also have to withdraw
from the European Union. See id. This analysis is supported by provisions stating the
adoption of the euro is "irrevocable." See id.; see also DEO ET AL., supra note 129, at 5
(indicating vagaries of Article 50).
134. See Curtis, supra note 132 (asserting that when Greece leaves the euro, there
will likely be a run on banks and Greece could be treated as a pariah state); see also DEO
ET AL., supra note 129, at 9-10 (stating that a Eurozone exit could cut valuable trade
ties with the rest of the European Union and could lead to civil unrest). Economic
modeling has estimated that the cost of a weak country leaving the euro would be
EU€9500 to EU€I 1,500 per person during the first year (forty to fifty percent of GDP)
and then EU€3000 to EUC4000 per person in subsequent years. See DEO ET AL., supra
note 129, at 10-11; ECON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 132, at 5, 10 (noting that
many companies would become insolvent and violent protests would likely occur in
members that left the Eurozone).
135. See ANSGAR BELKE & BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, DOOMSDAY FOR THE EURO
AREA: CAUSE, VARIANTS, AND CONSEQUENCES OF BREAKUP 13 (2011) (stating that social
unrest would almost certainly follow in the wake of an enforced currency conversion);
see also DEO ET AL., supra note 129, at 10, 14-15 (noting that historically, monetary
union breakups have led to authoritative governments or civil war, and that a country
with internal regional or ethnic divisions may split if one group wants to stay on the
euro); Curtis, supra note 132 (noting that Greece leaving the Eurozone could cause
other members to leave the euro decreasing exports and causing recession); Don
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If an economically strong country like Germany were to
leave the Eurozone, it would face the same legal problems in
attempting to exit.13 6 When the country's new currency
appreciates against the euro, the country's export sector would
be severely damaged. 137 The new higher valued currency could
1 38
put the country at a competitive disadvantage in trade.
Another attendant cost is in recapitalizing the domestic banking
system. 13 9 The cost of secession would ultimately be even more
expensive than an extreme bailout scenario, and so, in the end,
it is likely that all Member States will strive to remain in the
140
Eurozone.
The BVerfG's Sept. 7 Ruling has set constitutional limits on
how Germany can respond to the economic crisis. 141 While the
IMF, ECB, and other Member States all play critical roles in the

Melvin, Analysis: Leaving the Euro CarriesMassive Costs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 3, 2011,
available at LEXIS (noting that if Greece left the euro it would wreak havoc on the
global economy).
136. See DEO ET AL., supranote 129, at 12 (asserting that strong countries also face
difficulties in leaving the euro); see also ECON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 132, at 3
(noting the legal difficultly for a Member State attempting to leave the Eurozone).
137. See DEO ET AL., supra note 129, at 12 (indicating a higher valued currency
would damage the country's export business); see also David B6cking, Preparingfor the
Worst: The High Price of Abandoning the Euro, SPIFGEL ONLINE, Nov. 29, 2011,
http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/europe/0,1518,800700-3,00.html
(noting that
the new deutsch mark would appreciate and severely undermine exports).
138. See DEO ET AL., supra note 129, at 13 (implying a higher valued currency
would lead to a loss of competitiveness); see also B6cking, supra note 137 (noting that
the euro appreciated less than the deutsch mark and kept prices competitive).
139. See DEO ET AL., supra note 129, at 12 n.5 (stating that recapitalizing banks is a
cost that a strong country would face if it left the euro); see also ECON. INTELLIGENCE
UNIT, supra note 132, at 9 (noting that sovereign governments leaving the euro would
be saddled with the cost of recapitalization).
140. An economic model of a strong country such as Germany leaving the euro
estimates the costs at EUC6000 to EU€8000 per person during the first year (twenty to
twenty-five percent of GDP) and then EUC3500 to EUC4500 per person in subsequent
years. In comparison, if Greece, Ireland, and Portugal all defaulted on their debt with a
fifty percent haircut and the remainder of the Eurozone bought all outstanding
government debt in the market, it would generate a cost of a little over EUC1000 per
person in Germany. See DEO ET AL., supra note 129, at 14; see also Brad Plumer, Could
Germany Just Leave the Euro Zone? Not Easily, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Nov. 28, 2011,
4:20 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/could-germany-justleave-the-euro-not-easily/2011/11/28/gIQAhvjn5N blog.html
(indicating that a
breakup of the Eurozone could prove more costly to Germans than bailouts for its
neighbors).
141. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (noting the limits set by the

BVerfG in the Sept. 7 Ruling).
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euro crisis, Germany is perceived as the Eurozone economic
leader. 142 Some German politicians have rejected certain
measures that would quickly alleviate the financial stress put on
the Eurozone.14 3 Although more strain is put on the monetary
union, Germany is primarily seeking long-term solutions by
pursuing the prolonged process of amending the EU treaties in
a way that is acceptable to the GG before considering other
options, such as Eurobonds. 144 An independent non-EU treaty
known as the Treaty on Stability, Cooperation and Governance
("Fiscal Compact") has been signed among most European
Union Member States and proposes a fiscal compact that would
set automatic penalties to members that do not keep their
budgetary promises. 145 The treaty was designed to be
142. See Alan Wheatley, Analysis: Germany Holds the Key to Euro Zone Rebalancing,
REUTERS, Nov. 17, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/17/us-eurozonethinking-idUSTRE7AG13S20111117
(recognizing Germany's importance in the
Eurozone crisis); see also Daniel Hayden IV, Poland Begs Germany to Save Europe, INT'L
Bus. TImEs (Nov. 29, 2011, 8:06 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/258138/
20111129/poland-begs-germany-to-save-europe.htm
(noting that Polish Foreign
Minister Radoslaw Sikorski made pleas for Germany to do more to save the Eurozone
from collapse); Alan O'Keeffe, PressurePiles on Germany to Save the Eurozone as Debt Crisis
Deepens, EVENING HERALD (Jr.), Nov. 29, 2011, http://www.herald.ie/news/pressurepiles-on-germany-to-save-the-eurozone-as-debt-crisis-deepens-2948512.html
(stating that
pressure is mounting on Germany to save the Eurozone).
143. See O'Keeffe, supra note 142 (reporting statements by German Finance
Minister Wolfgang Schauble rejecting calls for the European Central Bank to act as a
"lender of last resort" in the Eurozone and dismissing demands for jointly guaranteed
Eurozone bonds to relieve the pressure on the most heavily debt-strapped nations); see
also Dowling, supra note 122 (indicating that Chancellor Merkel is holding out on
issues dealing with the ECB and Eurobonds).
144. See Chu, supra note 124 (stating that Chancellor Merkel does not intend to
transfer budgetary control to EU institutions); see also Hipp & Darnstddt, supra note 124
(quoting BVerfG Judge Di Fabio's statement that a fiscal union that merely enforces
budgetary promises does not surrender substantive powers and thus could be
acceptable under the GG); Nicholas Kulish & Steven Erlanger, Merkel Seeks Swift Action
on What May Be Long Job to Save the Euro, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2011, at A9 (noting that
historically there has been nothing speedy about amending the EU treaties and that it
took years to negotiate and ratify the last major change in the Treaty of Lisbon); Monti,
Merkel, Sarkozy Will Not Ask ECB Help to Stem Crisis, EURACTIVE.COM (Nov. 25, 2011),
http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/monti-merkel-sarkozy-ask-ecb-help-stem-crisisnews-509224 (noting that Chancellor Merkel may accept Eurobonds only after the long
process of fiscal integration).
145. See Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and
Monetary Union arts. 3(2), 8, Mar. 2, 2012 (not yet ratified), available at
http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26-enl 2.pdf
(indicating automatic correction mechanisms and penalty payments for members who

do not maintain their budget); see also Bill Cash, The Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination,
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incorporated into the EU treaties later on and although
amending the EU treaties could have a positive effect on the
market, doing so is a long and complicated process that
ultimately raises the question of whether to amend the GG to
146
form a more centralized, accountable, and stable Eurozone.
III. GERMANYS DIFFICULTDECISIONS AND THE FUTURE OF
THE EUROZONE
In its current state, the Eurozone is not functioning
effectively and ultimately it must either alter its structure or
change its membership. 147 After the signing of the Maastricht
Treaty, the European Union started down an ambitious path
towards integration. With the formation of the monetary union,
Germany and the rest of the Eurozone became caught in a

and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union is Unlawful, SOVEREIGNTY BILL (Mar.
5,
2012),
http://www.europeanfoundation.org/my-weblog/2012/03/the-treaty-onstability-co-ordination-and-govemance-in-the-economic-and-monetary-union-isunlawful.html (noting that the Treaty on Stability, Cooperation and Governance
("Fiscal Compact") is a non-EU treaty and that the Czech Republic and the United

Kingdom have not signed it). This type of fiscal compact is not considered a full fiscal
union since it does not involve transferring finances between members. See Crook,
supra note 126 (noting that the fiscal union proposed by EU leaders more closely
resembles a fiscal pact because it does not involve cross-border fiscal transfers, which
would be found in a true fiscal union); see also Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Merkel's
Teutonic Summit Enshrines Hooverism in EU Treaty Law, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Dec. 11, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8949723/Merkels-Teutonicsummit-enshrines-Hooverism-in-EU-treaty-law.html
(stating that Chancellor Merkel's
plan is not remotely a fiscal union).

146. See Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and
Monetary Union, supra note 145, art. 16 (indicating the intention that the treaty should
be incorporated into the legal framework of the European Union within five years); see
also Hickmann, supra note 127 (noting that Chancellor Merkel is considering the
possibility of a constitutional change); France and Germany Agree on EU Treaty Changes,
ALJAZEERA,
Nov. 24, 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/11/
2011112413328255455.html (observing that France and Germany have agreed on
making changes to the EU treaties, and reporting that Chancellor Merkel may soften
her stance toward Eurobonds after fiscal integration). Amending the EU treaties
requires unanimous ratification of the EU Member States. See Peadar 6 Broin, How to
Change the EU Treaties: An Overview of Revision Procedures Under the Treaty of Lisbon, 215
CENTER EUR. POL'Y STUD. POL'Y BRIEF, Oct. 2010, at 4 (noting that amendments to the
EU treaties require unanimous ratification by Member States according to Article 48 of
the TEU).
147. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (asserting that if the Eurozone
does not change in its ability to control members an alternative solution would be to
change the membership of the Eurozone).

2012] GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA WIN THE EURO-CPJSIS1579
pivotal transition period. 148 While a monetary union is in place,
an economic union is not.149 As of the drafting of this Comment,
the euro crisis is an ongoing event and the situation is
continually changing. Therefore, this Part discusses the
Eurozone only in regards to what was current as of March 2012.
Part III.A explains why the euro cannot be easily abandoned and
why the costs of exiting make it unlikely that any Eurozone
member will attempt to leave the common currency. Part III.B
discusses what actions Germany will have to take in the near
future in order to secure the Eurozone. This Part explains that
given the BVerfG's history, it may interpret the GG in a way that
would allow a fiscal compact and even Eurobonds to be lawful
under certain conditions. If not, the BVerfG may force the
German people to rewrite their constitution to allow more
political unity within the European Union in order to prevent
the collapse of the Eurozone.
A. The PotentialBreakup of the Eurozone
It is unlikely that the Eurozone will breakup or lose
members. 150 The exit of Greece from the Eurozone is unlikely
despite the social unrest in Greece caused by the fact that the
Greeks are displeased with the austerity measures that are being
placed on them in exchange for the bailout funds they
receive. 151 As hard as it is for the Greeks to accept the spending
cuts and sudden changes to once stable employment, the
alternative is worse. 152 If Greece decides to leave the Eurozone, a
messy default would occur shortly after, once the bailout money
ceases. 153 While sovereign default is still possible even if Greece
148. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that the Eurozone has a
monetary union without a fiscal union and Germany and France are seeking to form a
more unified fiscal policy within the Eurozone).
149. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (commenting that the Eurozone is
not an economic union).
150. See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text (discussing the legal difficulty
and economic hardship that would occur if member nations attempted to leave the
Eurozone).
151. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting the civil unrest and strikes
that have occurred in Greece).
152. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text (emphasizing the economic
hardship Greece would face if it were to leave the Eurozone).
153. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting that sovereign default

would soon follow if a weak country like Greece left the Eurozone).
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remains in the Eurozone, by leaving, Greece would risk
corporate default and bank-runs when the country adopts a
weaker currency.1 54 When banks lose money and businesses go
bankrupt, serious civil unrest is virtually inevitable. 155 Leaving
the Eurozone puts a country at risk of cutting vital political ties
156
and trade advantages with the rest of the European Union.
Therefore, a weak country would not find it advantageous to
voluntarily leave the Eurozone, nor is there any threat of being
forced out. 157 Germans, for their part, also may find it difficult to
imagine they are paying for the irresponsibility of the Greeks
and other faltering Eurozone nations, but supporting a large
bailout measure for the weak Eurozone countries is also less
1 58
costly than leaving the euro.
A breakup of the Eurozone also would have serious
nonfinancial consequences. In countries where domestic
tension already exists, if a certain region or ethnic group wished
to stay in the Eurozone, it could lead to a breakup of the country
attempting to leave. 159 Since there is no clear legal way to leave
the Eurozone, a country would have to exit from the European
Union entirely, possibly unilaterally, breaking treaties and
souring relations with the rest of the European Union. 160 Finally,
any kind of breakup would cripple the European Union's
political and economic influence in the world and destroy the
progress of integration that Europe has been striving towards for

154. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (stating that corporate and bank
defaults would occur if a weaker country left the Eurozone).
155. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (observing that a default
would leave Greece in economic ruin and a currency change would likely cause serious
social unrest).
156. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (noting that a Eurozone
country attempting to leave unilaterally could result in the loss of valuable ties with the
rest of the European Union).
157. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (recognizing that currently
there is no way to force a member out of the Eurozone and there would be serious
economic hardship if a member voluntarily exited).
158. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting that German bailouts are
less costly than exiting the Eurozone).
159. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (indicating that civil unrest in a
country trying to exit the Eurozone could cause a split within the nation).
160. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (observing that an exit from the

Eurozone implies an exit from the European Union).
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the past sixty years. 161 The accumulation of disastrous economic,
political, legal, and social consequences makes a breakup
scenario something all parties want to avoid.
B. FutureActions Germany Can Take to Preserve the Eurozone
Since a complete breakup of the Eurozone carries
disastrous consequences for the region, the remaining longterm solution is stronger integration and a change in the
functioning of the Eurozone. A long-term and permanent
solution to the economic crisis will come when the Eurozone
members form a fiscal union and Germany, as the strongest
economy, leads the way. 162 A more financially accountable
Eurozone, and the possible introduction of Eurobonds, will
require changes to the current EU treaties, and since these
changes are something that must be ratified by all EU Member
163
States, they could take years to implement.
To create a tighter fiscal union, EU treaties will have to be
amended. While the TEU already has guidelines for members'
debt, 164 it obviously is not enough since most of the Eurozone
countries have gone over the debt limit, including Germany. 165 A
treaty amendment is required to make the budget requirements
more binding and enforceable. 166 Amending the TEU, however,
is not an easy task because it requires unanimous consent from
all Member States and such agreements to amend could end up
167
in a political deadlock.
161. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting that European integration
has been steadily increasing over the past six decades and that the European Union has
become a strong political and economic entity).
162. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text (recognizing that Eurozone
leaders have considered the idea of a fiscal union and that Germany is leading the
Eurozone in putting forth plans for more fiscal discipline).
163. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text (noting that fiscal union
requires treaty changes that must be unanimously ratified and could take years to
implement).
164. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (reporting the treaty rules on debt
levels for Eurozone countries).
165. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that Germany has also gone
over the debt limits set out in the treaty).
166. See supra notes 127, 144-46 and accompanying text (recognizing that to
impose stronger regulation on fiscal policies of Eurozone members, the TEU would
have to be amended).
167. See supra note 146 and accompanying

text (indicating that unanimous

ratification is needed for a change to the EU treaties).
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Germany still needs to be concerned with finding a shortterm solution to the rising debt in troubled Eurozone countries.
While merely agreeing to reform the treaties could have a
positive effect on the markets, that alone might not be
enough. 168 The EFSF, together with the IMF, may not have
enough resources at their disposal to keep the larger debtridden members of the Eurozone from defaulting.1 69 In order to
avoid a possible default by weaker members before permanent
structural remedies are put in place, Germany may have to
170
support the calls to have the ECB act as a lender of last resort.
There has been pressure for the ECB to increase its bond
purchasing to provide short-term relief from elevated borrowing
costs, and the ECB has suggested it could do more if the
171
Eurozone adopted better budget discipline and enforcement.
Although this action may be politically unpopular in Germany
because it would cause inflation, the BVerfG has already been
lenient in determining the ECB's ability to purchase
172
government bonds.
For now, from the German perspective, the idea of joint
liability under Eurobonds is not an option. 173 The BVerfG's most
recent ruling denies the Bundestag from taking on this kind of
permanent liability because, unlike a bailout, it would be
relinquishing too much power from itself and from future
Bundestags, thus violating Article 38(1).174 German Chancellor
Angela Merkel has expressed support for creating a fiscal union
168. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (observing that the discussion of
reforming the EU treaties has had some positive effect on the market).
169. See supra notes 76-78, 82 and accompanying text (acknowledging that the
EFSF has limited funding and that larger economies would be too big to be rescued by
the EFSF).
170. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (explaining that Chancellor
Merkel is refusing to accept plans for the ECB to buy more Eurozone government
bonds).
171. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting that the ECB has been
pressured by other nations to take more action against the debt crisis and it suggested it
could do more if Eurozone members adopted better budget enforcement measures).
172. See supra notes 18, 91, 94, 99 and accompanying text (indicating that ECB
bond purchases would lead to inflation but that the BVerfG did not find the ECB's
current bond purchasing program to be in violation of EU law).
173. See supra notes 120-22, 143 and accompanying text (noting that Germany
currently refuses to accept Eurobonds).
174. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing that the Bundestag
is not allowed to agree to large future liabilities that are outside of its control).
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that does not lead to further loss of national sovereign power.
Such a fiscal union could be accomplished by giving European
institutions more power to enforce budgetary promises made by
Member States rather than direct control over the budget.
BVerfG Judge Udo Di Fabio has suggested that a fiscal union
structured in such a way could be seen as acceptable to the
BVerfG because the Bundestag would not lose any substantive
power over budget decisions. 176 Agreements like the Fiscal
Compact only involve Member States agreeing to penalties for
not adhering to their agreements rather than direct control of
the budget by EU institutions. 177 Thus, the Fiscal Compact could
be the foundation for the Eurozone to enter a full transfer
union.
Ultimately, a type of transfer union will be necessary to
secure the Eurozone in the future because another economic
crisis could still occur, even if members adhere to their
budgets. 178 The constitutional legality of a transfer union is
dubious given the BVerfG's latest ruling.179 ECB government
bond purchases are a way of spreading debt liability similar to a
transfer union but the ECB's actions, as they relate to other
nations, are outside of the BVerfG's jurisdiction180 The BVerfG
would still be able to rule on legislation that allows Germany to
accept Eurobonds. Eurobonds could be deemed constitutionally
acceptable if EU institutions had more control over enforcing
members' budgets such as under the Fiscal Compact. Under
such a scenario, liabilities would not be unforeseeable or
incalculable, since a stricter fiscal policy of checks and penalties
would be put in place to make such liabilities definite before

175. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (stating that Chancellor
Merkel's plans for a fiscal union do not involve giving budget control to a European
institution).
176. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (noting that BVerfG Judge Di
Fabio suggested that the proposed fiscal union could be acceptable under the GG).
177. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (indicating that the proposed
fiscal union is not a true fiscal union since it does not involve cross-border fiscal
transfers or joint liability).
178. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (asserting that a financial crisis can
occur even if EU members adhere to their budgetary policy).
179. See supra notes 104-06, 118-20 and accompanying text (noting the BVerfG's
language on the Bundestag accepting further financial liabilities).
180. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (asserting that the bond purchasing
of the ECB did not raise reviewable complaints in the BVerfG).
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Eurobonds would be granted.1 81 Moreover, Chancellor Merkel
has already suggested the possibility of accepting Eurobonds
18 2
after a tighter fiscal union was formed.
Given the history of the BVerfG, it is probable that the
Court could find a way to accept the idea of a type of transfer
union while highlighting exceptions that would allow the
Bundestag to maintain sovereignty.1 83 The BverfG has a history
of relenting to political pressure and supporting European
integration by never ruling directly against the European entity,
instead introducing exceptions and conditions that preserve
German rights. 18 4 A future ruling by the BVerfG could be similar
to the previous Solange decisions and EU integration rulings
where the BVerfG approved the European interests while
maintaining constitutional concerns. 18 5 The Court could rule
that the fiscal compact prevents liabilities from being completely
incalculable or uncontrollable, and if the Bundestag is given
approval power on the continued issuing of the Eurobonds, it
could retain its sovereign powers.
If the BVerfG finds a transfer union to be constitutionally
unacceptable, Germans may have to decide whether the era of
transferring power under the GG has reached its limit and the
constitution needs to be changed. Normally a change to the GG
could be done by a two-thirds vote in both the Bundestag and
the Bundesrat, but Article 79(3) prohibits amendments to
certain aspects of the GG including Article 1 and 20.186 Article
20 refers to basic institutional principles and has been used

181. See supra notes 105-06, 121-22 and accompanying text (commenting on the
BVerfG's ruling that the Bundestag could not accept liabilities that are triggered by
another nation).
182. See supra notes 144, 146 and accompanying text (noting that Chancellor
Merkel may consider Eurobonds as a possibility after a fiscal union is formed).
183. See supra Part L.A-B (indicating that in previous rulings, the BVerfG had
allowed the European measures to pass by attaching conditions to protect German
constitutional rights).
184. See supra Part L.A-B (noting that in earlier rulings, the BVerfG did not rule
directly against European action, but approved it with exceptions to preserve German
rights).
185. See supra Part IA-B (recognizing that in earlier holdings the BVerfG
preserved German constitutional rights without ruling against the European entity).
186. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (stating the mechanism by which
the GG can be amended); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that
Article 79(3) prevents alteration to core principles set out in Articles 1 and 20).
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18 7
previously to argue against further German integration.
BVerfG President Andreas VoBkuhle has already mentioned that
the Bundestag has maximized its ability to surrender core
powers to the European Union, and that a referendum would be
needed for further transfer of power.1 8 8 If the BVerfG believes
that entering into a full fiscal union cannot be accomplished
without surrendering more budgetary powers to the European
Union, then a parliamentary vote to amend the GG would not
be sufficient and a referendum would have to be made to adopt
a new German constitution. 189
The German people would have a referendum on the
continuation of European integration. Such a referendum could
be difficult to pass because it would entail the German people
voting to abolish German democratic sovereignty and transfer
power away from Berlin. 190 When the European Union was
established, the BVerfG ruled that EU institutions did not
independently satisfy the democratic principle, and that the
Bundestag remained the principal establishment for Germans to
satisfy the democratic process since homogeneity did not exist
within the European people. 191 As the European Union gains
more power and European people begin to see themselves as a
single group with less emphasis on nationality, the European
Parliament could take on the responsibility of preserving the
people's democratic rights in a fully united Europe. A United
States of Europe is a theoretical idea that could result from EU
Members' further integration in an effort to achieve greater
political, economic, and social unity, but Members may not be

187. See supra notes 36-38, 41 and accompanying text (describing Article 20 and
noting that in the Maastricht Ruling, the ratification of the treaty was challenged on
Article 20 grounds).
188. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting BverfG President
VoBkuhle's statement about Germany reaching its limit to the further transfer of power
to the European Union).
189. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (observing BverfG President
VoBkuhle's statement that a referendum would be needed for Germany to give up any
more core powers to the European Union).
190. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting that a vote by the German
people to change core principles of the Constitution is unlikely).
191. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (indicating that the BVerfG ruled
that the EU institutions did not independently satisfy the principle of democratic
rights).
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ready to relinquish this amount of sovereignty to EU institutions
at this point.
The concern of a loss of sovereign democratic status has
been challenged since the formation of the European Union,
and the BVerfG has circumvented this concern by claiming that
any further integration could be ruled on when the time
came.1 92 Even before Germany joined the Eurozone, there was a
concern that eventually a fiscal union would have to be
formed. 193 The BVerfG has allowed Germany to travel far down
the road of integration, and it is unlikely that it will now stand in
the way when the existence of the euro is in jeopardy. 194 If this
cannot be done, the pressure of a collapsing Eurozone might be
enough to get the German people-through referendum-to
rewrite the GG in such a way that it will pave the way for
Germany to enter into a fully integrated European Union.
CONCLUSION
Germany will have a difficult decision ahead regarding how
to reconcile continued integration into the European Union
with the constitutional restrictions of handing over any more
sovereign power. For now, ECB bond purchases and continuing
support from the EFSF seem to be necessary to defend against
immediate default. In the long-term, the European Union will
have to agree to stricter adherence to fiscal policy to allow
Germany to consider Eurobonds and a transfer union to secure
the Eurozone. Entering a full fiscal union with the Eurozone
raises the potential for a constitutional challenge as to the loss of
sovereignty and democracy within Germany, but such a union
could be structured in a way that is acceptable to the BVerfG.
Certainly Germany is not the only member of the Eurozone
that can prevent further integration through domestic laws or
192. See supra notes 10, 45-47 and accompanying text (noting that the BVerfG
had a history of concerns about violations to its sovereign powers and that in the
MaastrichtRuling, the BVerfG determined that future integration can be decided when
the issue arises).
193. See supra notes 15, 42 and accompanying text (identifying the argument that
a fiscal union would need to be formed to control a monetary union).
194. See supra Part I.B (noting that in prior cases involving European integration,
the BVerfG allowed Germany to transfer power to the European Union amid
constitutional complaints and was able to legitimize the actions taken by the German
government without directly ruling against the European interest).
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referenda. At this moment, however, Germany's large economy,
upon which the rest of the Eurozone depends for stability, puts
it in a leadership role. For this reason, Germany's position on
the bailouts and treaty reform to create a disciplined fiscal
union are of particular interest. Thus, German constitutional
law is going to continue to play a major role in deciding what
solutions are available to the Eurozone for solving its economic
problems. As Germany continues to integrate further with fellow
Member States, it may be forced to reassess its constitutional
identity. This process could happen quickly if the European
Union is to survive the current crisis. Ultimately, the euro, the
European Union, and the health of the global economy now
predominately rest in the hands of Germany.
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